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For Bailey, Sydney, and Gracey 
"We don't have to engage in grand, heroic actions to 
participate in the process of change. Small acts, when 
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In 1942 successful Al lied c ampaigns agains t Ad ol f 
Hitler's Wehrmacht in North Africa led to widespread captures 
of Axis prisoners. The British landscape could not 
accommodate the increasing number of prisoners, forcing them 
to call upon the United States to aid in prisoner of war ( POW ) 
internment. The number of POWs in the United States grew from 
fewer than 5,000 in April 1943 to more than 130,000 by mid-
August. At the conclusion of the Second World War, the 
United States had interned more than 400,000 Axis prisoners of 
war in more than 400 camps across the United States. In late 
1942 and early 1943 the government constructed numerous camps 
in isolated areas of the southern and southwestern regions of 
the United States. As the number of POWs on American soil 
increased, the federal government established camps beyond the 
South and Southwest. The United States Army, split into nine 
regional service commands, supervised the prison camps. 
Additionally, the Allied leadership shifted its stance from 
merely providing a secure environment for POWs to utilizing 
them in aiding the domestic war effort. 1 
1George Lewis and John Mewha, History of Prisoner of War 
Utilization by the United States Army, 1 77 6-1945 (Washington, DC.: 
Department of the Army, 1955 ) , 90; Terry Paul Wilson, "The Afrika 
In 1929, the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention allowed 
enemy prisoners of war to ameliorate considerable labor 
shortages in specified industries. These areas included 
agricultural labor, lumbering, mining, construction, food 
processing, and other non-governmental work not directly 
related to the war effort. The decision to employ Axis 
2 
prisoners served a practical purpose because some areas of the 
United States experienced severe civilian labor shortages by 
mid-1943. 2 
Prisoner-of-war camps provided civilian employers with 
desperately needed laborers, prompting the establishment of 
camps in locations that needed them most. In northern Iowa 
the Kossuth County town of Algona and the Page County town of 
Clarinda in southwest Iowa experienced the construction of 
such camps. Building prisoner-of-war camps near Algona and 
Clarinda placed the citizens of these communities in an uneasy 
position. Faced with an acute shortage of laborers, these 
Iowans turned to enemies for help. Camp officials 
deliberately and systematically engineered a relationship 
between the camps and the local communities that emphasized 
Korps in Oklahoma: Fort Reno's Prisoner of War Compound," Chronicles 
of Oklahoma 52 (Fall 1974): 362. 
2Lewis and Mewha, History of Prisoner of War Utilization, 90. 
3 
cooperation. This relationship fostered both the acceptance 
and employment of the enemy prisoners and contributed to the 
success of the camp's labor program. Acceptance for many 
community members did not mean an unquestioning fondness or 
affection for the prisoners, but rather an understanding that 
acceptance meant remaining loyal and contributing to the war 
effort. Although not always economically profitable, prisoner 
of war labor allowed local canneries, hemp plants, nurseries, 
and area farmers to meet their wartime production goals, 
permitting Iowans to help the war effort. 
This thesis will examine the concerted effort by camp 
officials to create a relationship with the surrounding 
communities that proved mutually beneficial while discussing 
the success of Camp Algona's and Camp Clarinda's prisoner-of-
war labor program from 1943-1946. 
4 
CHAPTER 1 
CONSTRUCTION AND ARRIVAL 
"[They] were in a happy and singing mood." 
In many respects the United States and Great Britain 
attempted to fight the Second World War independent of one 
another. Each nation had its own philosophy regarding 
strategic and administrative matters, and their relationship 
was frequently far from amiable. 1 Policy agreements between 
the United States and Great Britain often came as the result 
of protracted debate, and the issue of POW internment was no 
different. Once the United States agreed to establish a POW 
internment program little time passed before hundreds of camps 
had been erected to house the enemy prisoners of war. 
The United States did not become involved in Axis 
prisoner-of-war internment until after the successful Allied 
North African campaign of 1942. Great Britain's early 
involvement in the war meant that prior to November 1942 the 
majDrity of Axis POWs were detained in England and Northern 
Ireland, while early in 1942 the United States housed only 431 
prisoners. The Allied victories in North Africa dramatically 
increased the number of Axis prisoners in need of housing and 
1 Arnold Krammer, Nazi Prisoners of War in America (New York: 
Stein and Day, 1979), 1-2. 
5 
created a severe POW internment problem for Britain. As a 
result, Britain pressed the United States to help detain Axis 
POWs. The decision to house POWs in the United States also 
made logistical sense because American ships delivering 
supplies to the European war zone had been returning home with 
empty hulls. A change in American policy would allow enemy 
prisoners of war to be transported to the United States on 
these vessels. 2 After repeated British requests and months of 
protracted debate, the United States agreed to formulate a POW 
internment policy. The United States' final decision rested 
heavily on the belief that if Britain's inability to house 
increasing numbers of Axis POWs led to their poor treatment, 
American prisoners in enemy camps could be subjected to 
similar handling. 3 
The federal government had little time to develop its POW 
internment policy because enemy prisoners soon arrived on 
American shores. Subsequently, in order to reduce confusion 
the United States Army initially took sole control of POW 
internment. More agencies, however, eventually became involved 
to exert control over specific areas, which led to divisions 
2 Ibid., 2; Maxwell S. McKnight, "The Employment of Prisoners 
of War in the United States," International Labour Review 50 (July 
1944): 47-64; Charles A. Slavens, Thomas P. Slavens, and Peter H. 
Curtis, "Memories of a POW," Palimpsest 65, no.2 (1984): 53-67. 
3 Krammer, Nazi Prisoners of War in America, 2. 
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that in many respects hindered the overall progress of the 
prisoner-of-war program. Some of the agencies included t h e 
Military Police, the Quartermaster's Office, the commanding 
general of the Port of Embarkation, the Chief of 
Transportation, railroad officials, as well as the Director of 
the Intelligence Division. 4 The government's lack of 
experience in dealing with POW interment meant that policies 
were implemented and evaluated as necessary throughout the 
remaining years of the war. 
Before the first Axis POWs arrived on American soil 
government officials confronted the problem of camp 
establishment. The government was inexperienced in setting up 
POW camps, so an emphasis on security became the principal 
concern and foundation of the program. The War Department 
avoided building prisoner-of-war camps within 170 miles of 
coastal areas or within 150 miles of the Canadian and Mexican 
borders, because these locations dramatically increased 
security risks. Consequently the vast majority of the POWs 
would be housed in the South and Southwest. Initial concerns 
regarding the security of vital war industries prevented 
internment in the Midwest. In August 1942, however, the first 
significant shipment of prisoners arrived on American soil and 
4 Ibid., 17-18. 
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by the summer of 1943 between 10,0000 and 20,000 prisoners 
arrived per month. The burgeoning POW population in the United 
States eventually led to the establishment of midwestern 
internment camps, such as those in Iowa. 5 
Axis prisoners of war came to Iowa as a direct result of 
the efforts of local Chamber of Commerce officials lobbying 
Iowa Senator Guy M. Gillette, a subcommittee chairman of the 
Senate Agricultural Committee. 6 Officials, such as Hans 
Morgan of Clarinda and C. A. Phillips of Algona, believed 
their communities would benefit economically from the 
construction of a camp because it would stimulate the local 
economy with the influx of thousands of newcomers and possibly 
provide a source for agricultural labor. On 22 July 1943 
government representatives arrived in Algona to inspect 
possible sites for a prisoner-of-war camp and on 19 August 
1943, the Seventh Service Command, responsible for POW 
operations in the Midwest, authorized the construction of a 
prisoner-of-war camp. Citizens of Clarinda, Iowa, received 
notice two days later on 23 August 1943 that a similar camp 
5 Ibid., 2-36. 
6 Evidence of this lobbying is not documented, although this 
was the policy generally undertaken nationally. See Joseph T. 
Butler Jr., "Prisoner of War Labor in the Sugar Cane Fields of 
Lafourche Parish, Louisiana: 1943-1944," Louisiana History 14 
( Summer 197 3) : 283-296. 
would be built near their town. Senator Guy M. Gillette 
announced that the Army Corps of Engineers, operating out of 
Omaha, Nebraska, anticipated completion of the camps within 
two to six months. 7 Almost overnight the war came directly 
into the heartland. 
Construction of both camps began in much the same manner, 
as the Army Corps of Engineers called for new camps to be 
built in accordance with a standard design plan. Construction 
of Camp Algona on 287 acres two miles west of town and just 
north of the Milwaukee Railroad began in late September 1943, 
8 
while Camp Clarinda, begun a month earlier, was located on 273 
acres of land one and one-half miles southwest of Clarinda. 
The Army Corps of Engineers estimated that construction of the 
new camps would each cost approximately $1,000,000. 
Subsequently Lenci-Lenci, England and H. L. Staun, of 
Montgomery, Minnesota, received a contract for $1,000,000 to 
build the camp in Algona, while Olsen-Assemnacher-Rokahr, of 
Lincoln, Nebraska, received a contract of slightly less than 
$1,000,000 for construct Camp Clarinda. Camp Algona lagged 
behind Clarinda because contract letting had been postponed 
several times due to difficulty acquiring the land. The 
government acquired the land by first condemning the property 
7 Algona Upper Des Moines, 22 July and 19 August 1943; Clarinda 
Herald Journal, 23 August 1943. 
9 
and then paying compensation to the former owners. In 
Clarinda, for example, several farms were condemned by the 
government in order to accommodate the camp, with compensation 
totaling $37,750. Many of the property owners did not want to 
sell the land, and eventually one of the landowners, Francis 
Youngmark, filed a lawsuit. 8 
These companies set up offices in Clarinda and Algona, 
and an estimated 400 to 500-man crew per camp was needed for 
construction to begin. In addition to the camp, the Clarinda 
city waterworks needed enlargement in order to provide water 
for the camp, and a 100-foot wide crushed shale road was also 
built. The cities let the contracts and provided water, with 
payments made by the government for the water at a set rate. 9 
The United States Employment Office undertook the job of 
hiring workers for the construction companies. Algona's Labor 
estimates called for 250 carpenters, 200 laborers, and 225 
other workers for miscellaneous construction. In addition to 
the encampment, Camp Algona required a spur from the Milwaukee 
Railroad to be extended to the site, allowing for supply and 
POW transport. Payment for construction work was often better 
8 Algona Upper Des Moines, 19 August 1943; Clarinda Herald 
Journal, 2, 13, and 20 September, and 6 December 1943; See Slavens, 
Slavens, and Curtis, "Memories of a POW Camp" for an explanation on 
the difficulties involved in land acquisition. 
9 Clarinda Herald Journal, 9 September 1943. 
than that for farm labor and on 16 September 1943, due to the 
diminishing supply of agricultural laborers, local men 
classified as agricultural laborers with the county extension 
offices had to secure clearance from their extension agent 
before they could qualify for construction work. 1 0 With an 
already depleted local labor pool, the challenge of supplying 
this labor became difficult. 
As construction of the camps began, Algona and Clarinda 
10 
swarmed with new faces. With hundreds of carpenters, plumbers, 
and rail workers, apartments and restaurants filled bringing 
both economic prosperity and a housing shortage. Local 
citizens were asked to rent their spare rooms and apartments 
to laborers, although the supply never fully met the demand. 
In Algona, the housing shortage forced most of the workers to 
be quartered in a tent community at the local fairgrounds. At 
the height of construction, Camp Algona employed nearly 700 
men although the average number monthly ranged between 250 and 
300. The limited number of laborers slowed Algona's 
construction, but even though the construction of Camp Algona 
began first, Clarinda's POW camp opened earlier. 11 
10Algona Upper Des Moines, 19 August 1943; Kossuth County 
Advance, 21 September 1943. 
11 Algona Upper Des Moines, 19 August, and 16 December 1943. 
11 
Construction of Camp Clarinda began in September 1943 and 
the community of Clarinda faced some of the same dilemmas as 
Algona, especially that of an adequate labor force. The 
Clarinda Herald Journal ran advertisements offering payment of 
seventy cents per hour with time and a half over eight hours, 
which was about twenty to thirty cents more than local farm 
workers received. The region surrounding Clarinda, including 
Taylor, Page, Fremont, and Montgomery Counties supplied most 
of the labor, while Camp Algona's construction relied 
primarily on workers from Kossuth County. At the height of 
construction, Camp Clarinda employed nearly 750 men. 12 
Captain L. W. Wingett, the officer in charge of 
construction at Camp Clarinda, anticipated completion of the 
camp by the end of the year, provided the availability of an 
adequate work force of "laborers and mechanics." 13 On 11 
October 1943, Lt. L. D. Howard replaced Captain Wingett as 
officer in charge of construction, after supervising the 
construction of a similar camp in Atlanta, Nebraska. Despite 
the shortage of workers, Lieutenant Howard believed that the 
camp's construction progress met expectations, and he later 
12 Clarinda Herald Journal, 4, 7, and 11 October, and 8 
November 1943. 
13 Ibid., 4 October 1943. 
12 
announced the completion date to be 15 December 1 943. 14 While 
the construction continued, the workers provided considerable 
business for Algona and Clarinda. 
Once completed the camps had the capability of nearly 
doubling the local populations. Architectural designs 
permitted 3,000 POWs and 500 American soldiers to live in 
approximately 186 buildings. These buildings were set on 
concrete foundations and composed of wood frames covered by 
composition siding and roofing, with interior walls made of 
plasterboard. The camps consisted of four compounds, three 
for prisoners and the fourth for the American garrison. 
Barbed-wire fence with machine-gun manned towers at each 
corner separated the three prisoner compounds with twenty 
frame barracks each housing fifty men. Additionally, the 
camps included a post theatre, church, fire station, icehouse, 
machine shop, barn, hospital, electric distribution system, 
and water and sewage facilities. 15 
Camp construction followed the Geneva Convention to the 
letter. The Geneva Convention specified that prisoners-of-war 
and the guards of the captive nation be provided with the same 
accommodations. Therefore, American troops lived in an 
14 Ibid., 18 October, 8 November, and 13 December 1943. 
15 Kossuth County Advance, 21 September 1943; Algona Upper Des 
Moines, 18 January 1944; Des Moines Register, 26 January 1944. 
13 
identical compound outside the barbed wire that enclosed the 
three prisoner compounds. This American c omp ound included ten 
barracks for fifty men each, four mess halls, four lavatories, 
four company storehouses, four officer quarters, 
administration buildings, and a medical detail building. 
Unmarried soldiers were required to reside in the camp while 
married soldiers generally lived in town. 16 
On 2 December 1943 the Clarinda Herald Journal announced 
to the public the first information regarding enemy prisoners 
coming to Camp Clarinda. Initial reports suggested that the 
prisoners would be German. Confirmation of that information 
came on 15 December when the camp commander, Lieutenant 
Colonel Lobdell, announced that the first groups of Germans 
were expected soon after 1 January. The camp wasted no time 
in reassuring the community that security was of utmost 
importance. In order to secure against escapes local 
newspapers printed pictures showing the general character of 
the prisoner uniforms. The blue POW uniform had a large "PW" 
stenciled on the back, and various circulars informed the 
citizens how to react in case of an escape. The Clarinda 
Herald Journal expressed that the purpose of the camp could 
not be released, but reminded local citizens about the Italian 
16 h Kossut County Advance, 21 September 1943; Algona Upper Des 
Moines, 18 January 1944. 
14 
POWs that worked the previous summer as farm laborers at a 
f ormer Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) camp near Shenandoah . 
This article implied that providing useful labor could be a 
valuable function performed by the camp. 17 The community 
waited with eager anticipation for the camp's first enemy 
arrivals. 
With little warning, the first POW's arrived at Camp 
Algona on 22 January 1944, and three days later at Camp 
Clarinda, both groups coming by train. With thousands of 
enemy prisoners expected to arrive soon, these two contingents 
were work details expected to aid in making final camp 
preparations. Although both prisoner groups had traveled from 
Camp Clarke, Missouri, the Algona prisoners were Italian and 
Clarinda's prisoners were German. The Italian POWs had spent 
the last month working in a temporary camp near Eldora, Iowa, 
and according to several hundred of Algona's citizens, they 
were in a happy and singing mood upon their arrival. On 25 
January 1944 an additional 250 Italian POWs arrived and over 
the course of the next ten months the small community of 
Algona steadily grew in population. By October 1944, due to 
the presence of approximately 500 American guards under the 
17 Clarinda Herald Journal, 8 November, 2 December, and 15 
December 1943. 
command of Col. Joseph Church in addition to 2,600 enemy 
prisoners, Algona had grown in population by nearly 50 
percent. 18 
15 
The status of the Italian prisoners of war in the United 
States had changed prior to their arrival at Camp Algona. On 
25 July 1943, the Italian dictator, Benito Mussolini, was 
deposed. On 8 September 1943 an armistice with the Allies was 
signed and Italy's involvement in the war ended. A few weeks 
later Italy declared war on its former Axis ally, Germany, and 
the United States was placed in a precarious position. At the 
time of Italy's surrender more than 50,000 Italians were 
imprisoned on United States' soil. In order to resolve this 
possibly embarrassing situation of the incarceration of 
"Allied" prisoners, Italian POWs were named "cobelligerents" 
and given the choice to join what became known as Italian 
Service Units (ISUs). Since the Italians and the Allies 
remained skeptical of one another, the United States decided 
not to immediately free the Italians. Those Italian POWs who 
pledged allegiance to the Allies, however, were allowed to 
join ISUs, where they would be granted more freedom and be 
18 Des Moines Register, 22 January 1944; Algona Upper Des 
Moines, 18 and 25 January 1944; Office of the Provost Marshal 
General, "Weekly Report on Prisoners of War, as of 23 October 1944," 
World War Two file, Iowa State Historical Library, Des Moines. For 
a detailed account of the reaction to POW arrivals, see Krammer, 
Nazi Prisoners of War in America, 44-45. 
16 
able to perform jobs that were otherwise prohibited to German 
and Japanese prisoners. By 28 March 1944 new s repo rts stated 
that the Italian prisoners at Camp Algona had pledged their 
allegiance to the United States, and they were assigned to 
service in military industries across the country. The 
Italians at Camp Algona were then sent back to Missouri as the 
first main contingent of German POWs arrived in April. 19 
Citizens in Clarinda did not witness the arrival of the 
German work detail on 25 January 1944, comprised of 250 
prisoners, because the train dropped the Germans off directly 
at the camp. Clarindans did not have access to the camp since 
officials sternly warned the community to stay away after a 
number of local youths were apprehended when they attempted to 
get through the wire perimeter enclosure. Guards manning 
machine guns in the watchtowers could not distinguish whether 
the youths' clothing had the characteristic "PW" stenciled on 
them. Almost two months passed before the next contingent of 
POWs appeared in Clarinda. On 30 March 1944, approximately 
500 Germans arrived from a camp in Atlanta, Nebraska, and by 
19 Algona Upper Des Moines, 25 January and 28 March 1944; For 
more information on Italian POWs, see Louis Keefer, "Enemies Turned 
Allies: Italian POWs in Ohio," Timeline 50 (March-April 1993): 47-
55; Krammer, Nazi Prisoners of War in America, 283, note 43. 
17 
October Camp Clarinda housed near ly 2,500. 20 The first Germans 
to arrive were members of Hitler's vaunted Afrika Ko rps. They 
appeared good-looking, well fed, happy, friendly, energetic, 
and typically between twenty-one and twenty-five years old. 
As time passed, more POWs arrived from action in the European 
Theater. Some POWs came directly from overseas, whereas 
others came from various locations in the Seventh Service 
Command. 2 1 
Once the United States agreed to establish a POW 
internment program little time passed before this country was 
packed with enemy prisoners of war. Fewer than seventeen 
months had passed between the initial appearance of Axis 
prisoners in the United States and the first arrivals in 
Algona and Clarinda. Such a short period of time meant that 
Axis POWs interned in Iowa had to quickly learn to reorder 
their lives as prisoners of war, a process that depended 
heavily upon their daily lives in the camps. 
20 Des Moines Tribune, 22 January 1944; Des Moines Register, 30 
March 1944; Clarinda Herald Journal, 24, 31 January, and 30 March 
1944; Office of the Provost Marshal General, "Weekly Report.n 
21 Clarinda Herald Journal, 13 July, 21 and 28 September, and 2 




LIFE IN A POW CAMP 
"These tales are absolutely false. 
escape." 
There hasn't been one 
While the United States developed much of its prisoner-
of-war (POW) management program through trial and error, the 
enemy POWs themselves had to learn to reorder their lives as 
prisoners of war. Camp officials in Iowa deliberately and 
successfully created a relationship between the prisoners and 
their captors that ensured both a safe and productive 
environment. This same effort was made with the host 
community, thereby establishing a stable framework by which a 
successful POW labor program could be launched. 
At Camp Algona and Camp Clarinda, treatment of prisoners 
of war adhered strictly to the Geneva Prisoner of War 
Convention. The Geneva Convention was held during the spring 
and early summer of 1929, where representatives from major 
world nations met to modify international laws pertaining to 
the treatment of prisoners of war. This meeting resulted in 
the creation of the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention. 1 The 
1 For a detailed description of the Geneva Convention and its 
various articles, see George Lewis and John Mewha, History of 
Prisoner of War Utilization by the United States Army, 1776-1945, 
(Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1955), 66. 
United States signed the treaty in 1929 and the Senate 
ratified it in 1932. As a signatory the United States 
undertook the responsibility to provide that enemy prisoners 
on American soil received treatment according to the 
Conventions bylaws. 
According to the Geneva Convention the POWs received 
vaccinations and physical exams. They were fingerprinted, 
photographed, and checked for typhus carrying lice. In Iowa, 
depending upon the number of prisoners arriving at any given 
time, this practice took from a few days to a several weeks. 
The new arrivals were isolated during processing, as camp 
19 
officials attempted to prevent the exchange of information 
between old and new prisoners. 2 With processing complete POWs 
settled into typical daily routines. 
Prisoner camps across the country followed similar daily 
schedules. The prisoners awoke to the sound of reveille at 
5:30 a.m., and they had their beds made and breakfast eaten by 
6:30 a.m. The prisoners then marched from the mess hall back 
to their barracks, where they showered and cleaned up in 
preparation for the days work projects. These projects took 
place both inside and outside the camp. Those POWs contracted 
2 Clarinda Herald Journal, 21 September 1944; Des Moines 
Register, 1 and 2 October 1945; Arnold Krammer, Nazi Prisoners of 
War in America, (New York: Stein and Day, 1979) 46. 
by civilians for labor following the establishment of a 
national work program in January 1943, were loaded on to 
trucks by 7:30 a.m. and taken to the work site. Lunch was 
20 
provided to the prisoners at noon, and after three more hours 
of work the trucks were loaded for transferal back to camp. 
Once the POWs returned to camp they ate dinner between 6:00 
p.m. and 7:00 p.m. after which they had the remainder of the 
evening as free time. 3 
Camp officials followed the Geneva Convention closely. 
One particular bylaw of the Geneva Convention required that 
officers and enlisted men be segregated into separate 
commands. Consequently if officers and enlisted men were 
interned in the same camp, each group would be led separately 
from within its own ranks. In order to simplify such a 
situation, both the United States and Britain generally 
maintained separate camps for enemy officers and enlisted men. 
At Camp Clarinda and Camp Algona, POWs lived under the strict 
military discipline of their own non-commissioned officers 
(NCOs), because no German officers were ever present at either 
Camp Algona or Camp Clarinda. POW leaders answered directly 
3 Krammer, Nazi Prisoners of War in America, 48; Major General 
Arthur L. Lerch, "The Army Reports on Prisoners of War," American 
Mercury, May 1945, 541-42. 
21 
to the administrative staff of the camp, and helped facilitate 
the smooth running of daily activities. 4 
Food was particularly important to the daily life of a 
German prisoner in Iowa. Food and certain other items would be 
rationed in times of scarcity but, in general, prisoners 
interned within the barbed wire confines ate well since 
Article Eleven of the Geneva Convention required the 
comparable feeding of enemy POWs and the captor nations' own 
enlisted men. German prisoners cooked their own meals, three 
times a day, in their own mess halls, and most Germans 
preferred meat, potatoes, vegetables, bread, and pudding. 
Camp administrators went to painstaking lengths to provide 
food that the German POWs found appetizing. German soldiers 
from northern Germany liked a black type of rye bread similar 
to pumpernickel, while prisoners from southern Germany 
preferred white bread. Prisoners often enjoyed eating raw 
bacon between slices of these two types of bread. 5 
According to Camp Algona's commanding officer, Lt. Col. 
Arthur T. Lobdell, who replaced Colonel Joseph Church as 
commanding officer in June 1944, in 1943 and early 1944 the 
4 Des Moines Register, 23 April 1944; Krammer, Nazi Prisoners 
of War in America, 33. 
5 Des Moines Register, 2 October 1945; Algona Upper Des Moines, 
9 May 1944; Krammer, Nazi Prisoners of War In America, 49. 
22 
Germans were fed the same food as the Americans. When food 
became scarce in 1944, Colonel Lobdell stated "Grade A beef, 
butter and fresh vegetables were harder to get. Someone 
conceived the idea that quality would be equal if the food was 
pure and the quantity would be equal if the food contained the 
same number of calories as the American soldiers received." 
This policy took effect in 1944, and although fresh beef and 
vegetables continued to be shipped to the camp, they were fed 
to the American garrison. Lieutenant Colonel Lobdell 
remarked, "POWs got brains, intestines, fish and bones to an 
amount of 15 lbs. per 100 POWs per day. Their principal food 
was dark bread baked by Germans in our camp, then in addition 
macaroni, noodles, spaghetti, soy beans, peas, beans and other 
non-rationed food. Clerical workers got from 2500 to 3000 
calories per day, and POWs on hard labor got 3700 calories per 
day, which [sic] cost not to exceed $.25 per POW per day." On 
2 October 1945 the Des Moines Register announced that Algona's 
POWs were especially excited about a carp fest because the 
State Conservation Commission had donated two tons of carp 
seined from the Des Moines River. 6 
6 Arthur Lobdell, "Report from A. T. Lobdell to Governor Dwight 
Griswold 9 January 1947," Algona POW camp vertical file, Algona 
Public Library; Des Moines Register, 2 October 1945. 
23 
Prisoners purchased items from a facilit y in their 
compound, known as the Post Exchange, using canteen coupons. 
In 1941, based roughly on the twenty-one dollars per month 
earned by an American private, prisoners of war were paid 80 
cents per day for work outside of the camp, while soldiers who 
worked within the camp made 10 cents per day. According to 
Maj. Maxwell S. McKnight, chief of the Administrative Section 
of POW Camp Operations, "If the prisoner so elects, his 
allowance, in whole or in part, may be credited to a trust 
fund account, against which he may draw either for the issue 
of canteen coupons or to make purchases outside the prisoner 
of war camp if approved by the camp commander." By placing 
this money in a credit account, the prisoners could redeem the 
money after the war. Conversely, most prisoners chose to 
receive wages in the form of canteen coupons, redeemable at 
the PX. One Camp Algona officer stated, "They aren't 
interested in saving the money they earn. It doesn't mean 
anything to them as prisoners. They like real things that 
they can see and feel and use." According to Lieutenant 
Colonel Lobdell, at first the POWs had no confidence in any 
banking system and spent all they earned in the PX. In 1945 
they began saving and "when they left Algona in the winter of 
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1 946 ea c h averaged about $13 5 in American mone y in the f o rm o f 
a treasury check." 7 
Some of the items available at the prisoner canteens 
included money belts, razors, toilet articles, combs, brushes, 
tobacco, candy, soft drinks, classic literature, and radios. 
Name brand cigarette makers discouraged the selling of their 
cigarettes to POWs and the prisoners resorted to rolling their 
own. The reasoning behind this request rested on the fact 
that cigarette manufacturers could barely meet the demand of 
the American soldiers, let alone America's POW population. 
Prisoner canteens also provided beer for the POWs. Prisoners 
could buy two pints of beer per day once the POWs had returned 
to the compound for the night. This beer contained 3.2 
percent alcohol, the standard for Iowa. The prisoners 
believed this beer to be "too soft" because they were 
accustomed to 8-14 percent alcohol in Germany. This did not 
discourage the drinking of beer, but German prisoners often 
resorted to the fermentation of raisins, grapes, peaches, and 
other fruits in home made stills. The Army used profits from 
camp canteens to purchase inventory and to improve the 
7 First quote in Maxwell S. McKnight, "The Employment of 
Prisoners of War in the United States," International Labour Review 
50 (July 1944): 47; Second quote in Algona Upper Des Moines, 10 
October 1944; Final quote in Lobdell, "Report to Governor Dwight 
Griswold." 
prisoner quarters or for entertainment, such as games, 
athletic equipment and wood for woodworking and musical 
instruments. The canteen at Camp Algona raised enough money 
to purchase a fifteen-piece orchestra and a second hand 
piano. 8 
Recreational activities for German POWs helped pass the 
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time. Routine, monotony, and idle time challenged the camp's 
safe and secure environment. Combating boredom called for the 
engagement in various recreational activities to help pass the 
time. Some of these activities included choral groups, plays 
and theatre, while arts and crafts played an integral role in 
the daily life of German prisoners and gave the POWs a chance 
to express themselves. For example, the prisoners engaged in 
impressive painting and woodworking activities. At Camp 
Algona, German POW Edward Kaib and five of his cohorts created 
a notable example of prisoner woodworking. In November 1945 
the Christmas season brought the unveiling of a POW-made 
nativity scene at the camp. Throughout the course of a year 
8 Des Moines Register, 30 March, 23 April, and 2 and 8 October 
1944; Clarinda Herald Journal, 30 March 1944; Algona Upper Des 
Moines, 10 October 1944; Kossuth County Advance, 23 November 1944; 
Corinne and Wilbur Goecker, interview with the author, 21 Ma~ch 
2000, Clarinda, Iowa. · Mrs. (Noland) Goecker was the private 
secretary for Camp Clarinda's commanders, Lobdell and Ball, prior to 
her marriage late in 1944. The information regarding fermentation 
of alcohol applies directly to Camp Clarinda, but the German 
prisoners at Algona also may have distilled liquor. 
the prisoners carved and built the nativity scene with more 
than sixty half-life-size wooden figures. It remains on 
display year-round at the Kossuth County fairgrounds. 9 
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The prisoners at Camp Clarinda also engaged in impressive 
painting and woodworking activities. On one occasion Maj. 
Gen. C. H. Danielson, Commanding General of the Seventh 
Service Command, visited the camp. American officers at the 
camp presented Major General Danielson with a portrait of 
himself painted by a German POW as a birthday gift. Creating 
the portrait in his off-hours from a photo, the POW used 
materials provided by the American officers. The Omaha World 
Herald eventually published the portrait on 13 August 1944. 10 
Periodically prisoners of war sold or traded their works with 
guards, and on some occasions civilians ended up owning POW 
arts and crafts. 
The prisoners also became involved in religious 
activities. Initially the prisoners petitioned to have a 
religious program established within the camp, and local 
ministers provided services. Eventually the POWs received 
their own chaplain. Most of the Germans within the camps were 
either Roman Catholics or Lutherans. Colonel Earl Weed, Chief 
9 Algona Upper Des Moines, 29 November 1945. 
1° Clarinda Herald Journal, 21 August 1944. 
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of Chaplains of the Seventh Service Command, commented on the 
good will of the citizens of Clarinda and Algona in helping t o 
meet the religious needs of the prisoners. 11 
Undoubtedly a popular, labor intensive, recreational 
activity at Camp Algona and Camp Clarinda involved gardening. 
Camp Algona utilized seventy acres of land surrounding the 
compound for food production. A cold frame 100 feet long was 
planted with peppers, cabbage, tomato and celery. Winter 
provisions were also planted for storage, such as potatoes and 
squash. One hundred and twenty acres of land surrounding Camp 
Clarinda's compound grew food for all its inhabitants. The 
prisoners planted potatoes in most of the garden, with 
approximately five acres each set aside for peas, green beans, 
carrots, tomatoes, radishes, spinach, beets, onions, and 
cucumbers. Corn, however, did not appeal to the German 
prisoners at either camp. According to the POWs, corn was 
slop for hogs, although they planted ten acres of sweet corn 
for the American garrison. German POWs cultivated the garden 
using horse-drawn equipment, albeit completion of the work 
came mostly by hand. Flowers were planted in the extra 
sections, and they reserved thirty to forty acres for hay. 
The POWs also canned the vegetables for winter use and with 
11 Des Moines Register, 1 October 1945; Clarinda Herald 
Journal, 10 February 1944. 
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favorable conditions Camp Algona's harvested crops reached an 
estimated value of $50,000 per year. 12 
Prisoner-of-war camps in the United States provided safe 
and secure environments, although the issue of POW escapes 
still arose. The Army not only expected enemy prisoners to 
attempt to escape, but it also recognized escape as legal. 
Unlike civilian prisoners, Axis POWs were not criminals and 
the Geneva Convention guaranteed escape as a privilege. 
international policy encouraged escapes in American camps 
This 
because prisoners were obligated as soldiers to attempt to 
escape. Prisoners of war also attempted to escape due to 
temptation, the reduction of guard details as the war waged 
on, and by available opportunity. Although the government 
recognized escape as a prisoner's right, POWs escapees still 
faced possible punishment and risked death. In order to 
reduce escapes, those POWs caught escaping usually were 
courts-martialed and in rare circumstances shot. On one 
occasion at Camp Concordia, Kansas, a prisoner was shot while 
trying to retrieve a soccer ball that had been kicked over a 
guardrail near the main fence. Similarly, two POWs were shot 
12 Clarinda Herald Journal, 21 February 1944; Des Moines 
Register, 23 April 1944; Algona Upper Des Moines, 29 February 1943, 
and 3 and 9 May 1944; Kossuth County Advance, 10 July 1945; Des 
Moines Register, 23 April 1944. 
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at Fort Knox, Kentucky, after refusing to move away from the 
main fence. Occurrences such as these, howe ver, were rare. 
Despite numerous opportunities to escape, Maj. Gen. Arthur 
Lerch, Provost Marshal General, said the POW escape rate 
differed little from that of convicts held in American federal 
penitentiaries. In mid-April 1945 nearly 400,000 POWs lived 
in 490 bases and smaller branch camps in the United States. 
Reports indicated since the inception of the POW program in 
1943 that there had been just 1,583 escape attempts, with only 
twenty-two POWs still at large. 13 Camp Clarinda did not 
experience an escape during its two operational years, 
although escape attempts occurred at smaller branch camps 
under the direct administrative leadership of Camp Clarinda. 
Distance often hindered the effective transportation of 
POWs to locations in need of essential laborers, prompting the 
construction of temporary branch, or side camps, usually 
located at former Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) sites or 
in temporary tent communities. While in operation, Clarinda 
supported approximately ten such camps in Iowa, Missouri, and 
Kansas. One such camp near Orrick, Missouri, experienced a 
prisoner escape on 8 August 1944. A German POW, Kurt Koch, 
13 Krammer, Nazi Prisoners of War In America, 115-16, 126; John 
Hammond Moore, "The Wehrmacht in Virginia: 1943-1946," Virginia 
Magazine of History and Biography 85 (July 1977): 262-63. 
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escaped fleeing south towards the Mexican border. He first 
stole a civilian truck and then abandoned it for a Ford sedan. 
Koch also pilfered clothing but a woman near Excelsior 
Springs, Missouri, noticed and reported him to the local 
sheriff's department. Following his return to Camp Clarinda, 
Koch stood trial before a special courts-martial hearing. 
After the delivery of a guilty verdict, Koch found himself 
"sentenced to six months at hard labor in the camp stockade 
with the additional forfeiture of all pay." With 90 percent 
of all POW courts-martials being escape related, escapees 
across the country could expect the same punishment. 14 
The only other escape attempt from a Camp Clarinda branch 
camp occurred 2 November 1944 near Marston, Missouri. While 
performing contract labor in a cotton field some 600 miles 
from Clarinda, two German POWs escaped, but little time passed 
before their capture. Due to the lack of effective 
deterrents, such as machine gun-manned watchtowers and barbed-
wire fences, more escapes occurred at branch camps. But 
prisoners of war simply had nowhere to go, with the vast size 
of the United States being more than they had imagined. 
Moreover, life as a POW had more appeal than that of a soldier 
14 Clarinda Herald Journal, 14 August 1944; Kansas City Star, 
11 August 1944; quote in Krammer, Nazi Prisoners of War in America, 
144. 
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risking his life in Europe. Lastly, Camp Clarinda did 
everything in its power to prevent effective escapes. The 
Clarinda Herald Journal repeatedly reassured local citizens 
that if an escape occurred, immediate announcement from the 
media would help assure a rapid capture. Such announcements 
often came at times when false reports of escapes spread 
throughout the community. On one such occasion Lt. Col. 
William Ball, who replaced Lieutenant Colonel Lobdell as camp 
commander in July 1944, stated, "These tales are absolutely 
false. There hasn't been one escape, if so they'll be made 
public." Recent sightings of prowlers in the Clarinda area 
undoubtedly prompted the rumors. 15 
Despite a few scattered difficulties, German prisoners of 
war in Clarinda's branch camps caused little trouble for their 
American captors. The most troublesome POWs, such as hard-
core Nazis, were shipped to camps in Oklahoma, Colorado, and 
Arizona in order to isolate them. The only evidence 
supporting a Nazi presence at Camp Clarinda involved a funeral 
and the celebration of Adolf Hitler's birthday. On 12 August 
1944 a prisoner died at a branch camp near Hannibal, Missouri. 
The prisoner received a full funeral on a plot north of 
15 Clarinda Herald Journal, 26 October, 2 November, and 27 
January 1944. 
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Clarinda that included the draping of a Nazi flag bearing a 
swastika over his coffin. Additionally, Nazi flags and 
pictures of Hitler adorned the POW barracks. On another 
occasion, the German prisoners at Camp Clarinda requested 
permission to celebrate Hitler's birthday, despite permission 
being denied, some of the prisoners celebrated anyway and the y 
were punished. 16 
Flare-ups occasionally occurred, especially as the war 
reached its final stages. Due to recent war news and 
shortages of POW rations, cut 25 percent due to a lack of 
supply, a labor detail of eleven Germans refused to work 
because the weather was too cold. These prisoners lived on 
bread and water diets until they decided to work. In a similar 
situation, C. C. Archer, superintendent of the Fort Hays 
Kansas Experimental Station, charged the War Department with 
reducing POW food supply. Evidently prisoners at a nearby 
branch camp had lost ten to twelve pounds and could not 
perform the tasks they had been hired to do. Situations such 
16 Clarinda Herald Journal, 12 October 1944; Corinne and Wilbur 
Goecker, interview with the author, 21 March 2000. 
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as these were abnormal, and a good captor-captive relationship 
developed at Camp Clarinda. 17 
Conversely, Camp Algona battled prisoner escapes in the 
first year of its operation. Lieutenant Colonel Arthur T. 
Lobdell replaced Colonel Church as Algona's commanding officer 
in June 1944 to help secure the camp. Two German prisoners 
had cut a hole in the compound fence and escaped early on a 
rainy Sunday morning, 30 May 1944. According to the Algona 
Upper Des Moines, due to "an acute shortage of guards" the 
camp failed to detect the POW's escape until an hour later. 
The two Germans made it as far as West Bend, where, according 
to the Algona Upper Des Moines, residents gathered and 
"seemingly held a field day in honor of the 2 POWs." 18 Another 
German escape at Camp Algona was reported on 1 June 1944 but 
the German prisoner turned himself into the sheriff the 
morning after his escape. The Kossuth County Advance noted 
that the POW, Alois Stephen, attempted to "make the home 
guards 'lose face' with home people since they [prisoners] 
don't even try to get out of vicinity and turn themselves in 
right away." One month later on 6 July 1944 a farmer and his 
17 John Hammond Moore, "Wehrmacht in Virginia," 272; Shenandoah 
Evening Sentinel, 7 March and 17 April 1945; Des Moines Register, 1 
October 1945. 
18 Algona Upper Des Moines, 30 May 1944. 
son captured two escaped Algona POWs in their cornfield. The 
father and son were armed, with shotguns, and waited for 
officers from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and camp 
security to arrive. Three German prisoners of war escaped 
from an Algona branch camp near Owatonna, Minnesota, a year 
later in September 1945. These prisoners went to the Steele 
County fair, where they were discovered enjoying the 
activities. Once they were apprehended, Lieutenant Colonel 
Lobdell placed them on a bread and water diet for ten to 
fourteen days. 19 
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Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Lobdell explained that during 
his years of intensive training, the German soldier was given 
instructions to continue the war effort even if taken 
prisoner. Additionally, "The P.W.'s on being sent out to work 
generally tried to pass out propaganda sheets and talk to 
anyone they could regarding their Nazi plans." Local law 
enforcement agencies occasionally received phone calls 
regarding leaflets or flyers that were found promising German 
victory and containing crude drawings of swastikas. German 
POWs that were sent out to work in the surrounding community 
often attempted to distribute propaganda. One such leaflet 
discovered in June 1944 was made with pencils and colored 
19 Ibid., 27 September 1945; Kossuth County Advance, l June and 
6 July 1944. 
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crayons, promising victory for Rommel. Local law enforcement 
officials worried that some l ocal citizens might attribute the 
leaflet to a neighbor and start a witch hunt. Another 
handbill found near Mason City stated "Americans! Quit the 
War! You gain nothing but blood, sweat and tears!" This 
evidence supports the argument that a small c ontingent of 
hard-core Nazi's lived at Camp Algona. 20 
Some of the trouble with escapes at Camp Algona may be 
attributed to the influence of Nazism among the German 
prisoners. Nationally, the Army considered approximately 8 to 
10 percent of German POWs fanatical Nazis, while nearly 30 
percent sympathized with Nazi ideology. American officials 
did not understand the depth of Nazi political ideology. They 
assumed that all German prisoners were Nazis. This ignorance, 
demonstrated by the fact that anti-Nazis were not segregated 
from Nazis upon arrival, led to small contingents of Nazis 
exerting internal control over most camps through 
intimidation. 21 
20 Arthur Lobdell, "Report Governor Dwight Griswold." For other 
reports pertaining to Algona prisoner escapes see Kossuth County 
Advance, 1, 22, and 26 June, and 6 July 1944; Waverly Independent 
Republican, 28 June 1944; Algona Upper Des Moines, 30 May 1944 and 
27 September 1945; McKnight, "The Employment of Prisoners of War," 
55. 
21 Thomas Buecker, "Nazi Influence at the Fort Robinson POW 
Camp During World War II," Nebraska History 73 (Spring 1992), 32-41. 
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According to Lieutenant Colonel Lobdell a group of POWs 
ar r ived in January 1944 that included ninety-one S.S. troops. 
Lobdell stated, "Most of these had been tattooed under their 
right arm pit. This tattoo was their mark of authority over 
other German prisoners. The tattoo gave their individual 
blood type and assured them the first treatment if they were 
wounded." These men commented they had been "mated" to S.S. 
women in order to bear S.S. children for the Third Reich. 
Lobdell said that these Nazi's were "insolent, insubordinate, 
and it was evident that our camp feared the new arrivals." 
Since the Nazi S.S. prisoners violated camp policy and refused 
to work, Lobdell instituted a "no work, no eat" policy, where 
the POWs were placed on a bread and water diet. After this 
policy began, ten Nazis came out to work on the second day, 
twelve on the seventh day, twenty-three on the ninth day, 
thirty-five on the tenth day, six on the twenty-sixth day, and 
four on the twenty-eighth day. The last four S.S. men were 
required to work eight hours putting asphalt on roofs before 
they were given food. Lobdell remarked that these S.S. men 
told him "that they had gone longer periods in the open on the 
Russian front living on leaves, roots, and vegetables they 
could find. On bread and water the first three days are the 
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worst, the eleventh and thirteenth days are bad, then there is 
no great change as the stomach has shrunk." 22 
As a result of the Nazi presence at Camp Algona, in July 
1944 Lieutenant Colonel Lobdell was approached by a German 
prisoner who claimed to be anti-Nazi. This POW informed 
Lobdell of three other anti-Nazis, and eventually the number 
reached forty-five. These forty-five anti-Nazis, and 
eventually one hundred more by the winter of 1944, were sent 
to Camp Campbell, Kentucky. Camp officials assumed all German 
POWs were Nazis, and those who proclaimed to be anti-Nazi were 
transferred immediately to avoid harassment. No specific 
documentation of harassment has been discovered involving Camp 
Algona, but nation-wide this harassment generally included 
s½rutinizing personal conversations to spot anti-Nazis, then 
beating and sometimes killing them. One German POW stated, "I 
know of two instances where men were killed in the latrines 
and thrown in the toilets. No part of them was ever found. 
They were victims of die heilige Geist [the Holy Ghost], which 
meant the Nazis running the camp had murdered them because 
they suspected them of having collaborated with the 
22 Lobdell, "Report to Governor Dwight Griswold." 
Americans." 23 In order to fight the effect s of Naz i 
propaganda, the government eventually instituted a prisoner 
re-education program. 
By 1944 the political make-up of post-war Germany 
concerned Americans. The destruction of fascism seemed 
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inevitable but government officials feared another form of 
authoritarianism could replace it. A new policy of re-
education was implemented on 6 September 1944, one that would 
expose German prisoners to political democracy. Officials 
felt this exposure would ensure, upon return to Germany, the 
foundations of a democratic Germany. In order to aid in the 
"Americanization" of German POWs, camps across the United 
States instituted these re-education programs. The goal of 
the programs was to inform the POWs about the fallacies 
imbedded in the anti-democratic propaganda of the Third Reich. 
Achievement of this goal rested primarily on the use of films 
disproving the Nazi claims that "America is decadent, 
inefficient, and corrupt," in addition to anti-Nazi camp 
23 Ibid.; Buecker, "Nazi Influence at Fort Robinson," 35; 
Quoted in Lewis H. Carlson, We Were Each Others Prisoners: An Oral 
History of World War II American and German Prisoners of War, (New 
York: BasicBooks, 1997), 155. 
newspapers and "self-education opportunities in democracy, 
history, civics and the English language." 24 
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Information describing Camp Algona's and Camp Clarinda's 
re-education programs does not exist except for a 4 July 1945 
article in the Des Moines Register, explaining that German 
POWs at Camp Clarinda viewed a special screening of an 
atrocities film, depicting the "Nazi treatment of captives at 
Buchenwald." Nationally, the entire re-education effort 
remained a secret due to the government's fear that exposing 
the program would put Americans in German camps in jeopardy, 
because critics of re-education referred to it as 
"brainwashing."25 The government's secrecy stemmed from the 
fact that according to the Geneva Convention Axis prisoners 
were to receive regular visits from international delegates 
representing their nations. 
Article eighty-eight of the Geneva Convention guaranteed 
unrestricted access of POW camps by neutral organizations and 
authorized them to inspect and bring certain supplies to the 
camps. Periodically throughout Camp Clarinda's and Camp 
Algona's existence the Swiss and Spanish Legations, 
24 Quote in Krammer, Nazi Prisoners of War in America, 198. 
25 Kossuth County Advance, 23 November 1944; Quote in Des 
Moines Register, 4 July 1945. For more on re-education see Curt 
Bondy, "Observation and Re-education of German POWs," Harvard 
Educational Review 14 (January 1946): 12-17. 
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representing both the United States and Germany, made visits 
to Iowa. The Swiss visited camps within the United States as 
well as Germany. International representatives from the Young 
Men's Christian Association (YMCA) and the International Red 
Cross Committee also paid visits to both camps, as did medical 
commissions that checked POWs to determine the eligibility of 
certain sick and wounded for repatriation. 26 
These visits were of paramount importance because any 
findings of American mistreatment of Axis prisoners could have 
a dire impact on American POWs in Axis camps. Therefore, the 
prisoner-spokesmen from the camps who met with these 
organizations had the hypothetical ability to negatively 
affect thousands of American lives overseas. Visits, however, 
generally went smoothly at both Iowa camps. For instance, 
regarding the eating habits of German POWs in American camps, 
prisoners asked the German Red Cross through the Swiss 
representatives to keep food and tobacco in Germany because 
they were getting all that they needed. 27 The positive 
treatment of Axis prisoners and the safe environment would 
help to ensure the safety of American prisoners in Axis camps. 
26 Clarinda Herald Journal, 15 June and 27 July 1944. 
27 Krammer, Nazi Prisoners of War in America, 49. 
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Safety records for both the military and industries using 
POW labor were remarkably good. Far more dangerous than work 
related injuries were the possibilities of traffic accidents 
on route between camp and work site. On one such occasion 
involving Camp Clarinda, three German prisoners died in a 
collision on 8 August 1945 when the truck they were traveling 
in crashed. Seven other POWs were also injured. Another 
accident on 7 August 1944 four miles south of St. Joseph, 
Missouri, resulted in a broken leg for a German prisoner. 28 
The only other death reported among German POWs within Camp 
Clarinda's control took place on 12 August 1944 when a 
prisoner died of an apparent heart attack at a branch camp 
near Hannibal, Missouri. 29 
Fair treatment of German prisoners of war came with hopes 
of inspiring more Germans to surrender. Captain Clyde 
Herring, a former POW himself, reported that German speaking 
American soldiers overheard German civilians talking about the 
fair treatment their relatives received in the United States. 
German soldiers, hearing of the treatment their comrades 
received in American as opposed to Soviet camps, were more 
28 Ibid., 282; Clarinda Herald Journal, 7 August 1944 and 16 
August 1945. See also "15 Nazi Prisoners Killed, 9 Others Hurt When 
Train Hits Truck in Michigan," New York Times, l November 1945. 
29 Clarinda Herald Journal, 12 October 1944. 
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likel y t o surrender t o American troops. Thi s i n t u rn l ed t o 
mass s u rrenders. 30 News s u ch as this h a d a tremendo us affect 
on the citizens of Clarinda and their acceptance of its German 
inhabitants, since a number of Page County soldiers had become 
occupants of European prison camps. 
The establishment o f prisoner-of-war camps in Iowa 
occurred quickly. Despite the speed of the process, Camp 
officials in Iowa deliberately and successfully created a 
relationship between the prisoners and their captors that 
fostered a safe and productive environment. This same effort 
was made with the host community, thereby establishing a 
stable framework by which a successful POW labor program could 
be launched. An effort such as this proved necessary because 
locating prisoner-of-war camps outside of Algona and Clarinda 
placed the citizens of these c ommunities in an uneasy 
position. By 1942 Iowans had begun to feel the pains of a 
dwindling supply of agricultural workers. Faced with such an 
acute shortage of laborers, Iowans near Algona and Clarinda 
were forced to turn to their enemies for help. 
30 Terry Paul Wilson, "The Afrika Korps in Oklahoma: Fort 
Reno's POW Compound," Chronicles o f Oklahoma 52 (Fall 1974): 367; 
Shenandoah Evening Sentinel, 26 June 1945. 
CHAPTER 3 
PRISONER-OF-WAR LABOR 
"The only possible way we know for supplying adequate 
labor for your farming needs is to help make prison labor 
available for you." 
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By the end of 1942 Iowa began to suffer from a labor 
shortage because many of the state's workers had joined the 
armed services. In February 1941, the local National Guard 
unit, an anti-tank unit of the 168 th Infantry Regiment in 
Clarinda, received its mobilization orders. The departure of 
the 168 th Infantry Regiment depleted the community of 2,000 
potential laborers. In early 1942 the United States Employment 
Service appointed volunteers to approximately 1,000 stations 
in Iowa for the purpose of informing the state labor office of 
the employment situation in every community. In April 1942, 
the Clarinda Herald Journal reported no signs of a farm labor 
shortage. This statement was misleading since the farm labor 
supply in Iowa was 71 percent of normal, down 15 percent from 
1941. 1 
With thousands of hungry soldiers being shipped overseas 
daily, key agricultural states such as Iowa increased food 
production. In March 1942 the Algona Upper Des Moines asked 
1 Clarinda Herald Journal, 25 June, 23 April, and 19 November 
1942. 
Kossuth County farmers to raise mo re sugar beets in o rder t o 
keep the two state sugar beet plants at fu ll opera t i on . The 
fear of an inadequate labor supply caused hesitation among 
local farmers. Additionally, Kossuth County farmers were 
requested to increase hog and egg production and to raise 
In north their soybean and flax crops by 5,000 acres each. 
central Iowa the United States Employment Service 
representative John Gish noted the probable farm labor 
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emergency for the coming season and called on everyone to 
help. 2 Concern among farmers grew by August 1942 and the 
Algona Upper Des Moines noted that the 4,245 farm families in 
Kossuth County found the job of increasing production 
difficult due to a falling labor supply, higher farm wages, 
and the limited availability of machinery and supplies. The 
last county census showed only 848 hired hands in the county 
and since that count available labor had decreased from 28 
percent to 59 percent in some areas. Drafting and high wages 
paid by government industries drained the farms of their 
manpower and the Algona Upper Des Moines remarked, "It begins 
to look like the army boys may have to fight on empty 
stomachs." 3 
2 Algona Upper Des Moines, 24 March and 14 April 1942. 
3 Ibid., 28 July and quote in 13 October 1942. 
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The labo r s i t uati on i n north cent ra l Iowa became e ven 
more complicated when the federal governmen t announced p l a n s 
to build a $335,000 hemp plant near Algona. During the 1943 
season farmers within a 15-mile radius of Algona were 
encouraged to plant hemp, with the minimum contract being ten 
acres for a countywide total of 4,000 acres. The chairman o f 
the state Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA ) stated 
that fifteen counties in north central Iowa had been asked to 
raise hemp, a crop he thought midwestern farmers should 
produce. Hemp could grow on soil suited for corn, and the War 
Food Administration considered northern Iowa to have some of 
the best corn soil in the world. Shortages of rope for 
merchants and the United States Navy had become an acute 
problem. Prior to Pearl Harbor 98 percent of America's hemp 
was imported from the Philippines, which was now in Japanese 
control. Kossuth County could grow under ordinary and 
fa v orable conditions from three to three and one-half tons of 
hemp per acre, which processed into 900-1600 pounds of fiber. 
The government provided the seed to the contracting farmer, 
which cost between twelve and fourteen dollars per acre. That 
charge was deducted once the crop was deliv ered. Around 1 
September the government would send a hemp harvesting machine 
and provide an operator to be paid for b y the farmer at the 
time of settlement. Local farmers would receive ninety 
dollars per acre of revenue from the AAA, good compared to 
other crops. 4 Some farmers, fearful of the future, began to 
anticipate possible labor shortages. 
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Early in 1943 farm leaders in Kossuth and Page counties 
began to prepare for a possible reduction in the number of 
farm workers. Local farmers in Page County established the 
Page County Emergency Farm Labor Organization to aid the 
recruitment and placement of farm laborers within the area. 
Shenandoah, on the western border of Page County, established 
a farm labor office to help resolve neighboring Fremont 
County's farm labor shortage. Concerns about the insufficient 
supply of farm labor were real; wartime production goals 
necessitated that 110,000 acres of corn be planted in Page 
County in 1943, with approximately 6,000 acres of hybrid seed 
corn alone surrounding Shenandoah. 5 In Kossuth County, local 
leaders established the Kossuth County Emergency Farm Labor 
Organization. Due to increased wartime production goals more 
than 200,000 acres of corn, 60,000 acres of soybeans, 14,000 
4 Ibid., 24 November 1942; 7 January 1943. 
5 Annual Narrative Reports, Page County Extension Office, 1943, 
3-7. For a descriptive account of wartime agricultural production in 
Iowa, see Dorothy Schweider, Iowa: The Middle Land, (Ames: Iowa 
State University Press, 1996), 276-77; Annual Narrative Reports 
compiled by county extension agents are found in the special 
collections department of Parks Library at Iowa State University. 
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acres of flax (which was nearly twice the harvest in 1942), 
and 4,000 acres of hemp had been planted i n Kossuth County for 
the 1943 season, including a few thousand acres of hybrid seed 
corn surrounding Algona. The soybean and corn production 
goals were the largest in the state of Iowa. 6 
In north central Iowa, the Algona Upper Des Moines stated 
in a July article titled "Kossuth Situation Serious," that 300 
workers were needed to detassel 1,000 acres of corn. 
Insufficient labor supplies would jeopardize the 1943 seed 
corn crop unless it was detasseled at the right time. 
Additionally, early winter weather in November delayed the 
hemp harvest, and made binding and shocking the hemp with 
machines difficult due to ground conditions. For that reason 
many acres had to be bound and shocked by hand. 7 Despite 
labor shortages, Kossuth County Extension Director A. L. Brown 
considered the 1943 Kossuth County harvest season an overall 
success. This success was due in large part to the 
organizational efforts of Brown and because 75 percent of the 
labor requests were for seasonal help, in which many farmers 
met each other's needs. According to Brown, although there 
6 Annual Narrative Reports, Kossuth County Extension Office, 
1943, 7. 
7 Algona Upper Des Moines, 8 July 1943. 
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was little surplus labor available only a small percentage of 
farmers had to curtail production. 8 
In the fall of 1943 with the harvest season ahead, the 
farm labor problem in Page County became acute. The farm 
extension office reported that labor demands were exceeded by 
the supply of available workers. In September 1943, 76 
percent of Page County farmers reported that they would need 
help at corn shucking time, although the largest demand was 
for year-round help. Without outside labor, most Page County 
farmers turned to each other to help harvest their crops. One 
such dairy farmer near Clarinda called on five farmers whose 
ages ranged from forty-three to eighty-three to help shuck 
fourteen acres of corn. 9 While local farmers had to find ways 
to harvest their crops, the labor programs at Camp Algona and 
Camp Clarinda were getting under way. The success of the 
camps' labor programs depended on the availability of POWs as 
well as the civilian employers' willingness to use them. 
According to international law the captor nation had to 
provide medical attention, food, shelter, and clothing to the 
POWs. Despite these burdens, during the Second World War both 
8 Annual Narrative Reports, Kossuth County Extension Office, 
1943, 6. 
9 Clarinda Herald Journal, 30 September, 25 October, and 25 
November 1943. 
49 
the Allie s and the Axis c onsi dered POWs as a p otentia l s ource 
of labor. Th r oughout the Second World War the federal 
government carried out negotiations with Axis nations, through 
neutral nations, with reference to the labor, pay, treatment, 
exchange, and repatriation of prisoners of war. The Geneva 
Convention prohibited wo rk directly related to military 
operations. Exceptions were labor that was necessary for 
food, shelter, and clothing although the military might 
benefit from it. Prisoners could work in agriculture, 
including food processing and in clothing plants although 
combat soldiers directly benefited. In 1942, the War 
Department set forth guidelines regarding POW pay and 
established two classes of prisoner-of-war labor. The 
Convention required that all prisoners below the rank of 
sergeant must work either inside o r outside the camp when 
instructed, while non-commissioned officers and officers could 
request work. Prisoner-of-war labor was divided into classes. 
Class I included labor required to maintain prison camps, 
while Class II involved all other types of labor not directly 
connected with military operations. In most instances the 
factor that determined where POWs were employed rested on the 
Geneva Convention and how the War Department interpreted it. 10 
10 Lewis and Mewha, History o f Prisoner of War Utilization, 
I owa ns, namely tho se residing in Kossuth, Page, and the 
s u rroun d ing count i es, cared most abou t Class I I labor and its 
possible use for farm labor. 
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Axis prisoners of war began arriving in Iowa in late 
1943, when Page County farmers experienced the beginning of a 
severe farm labor shortage. The DeKalb Agricultural 
Association of Shenandoah, producers of hybrid seed corn, 
anticipated an inadequate supply of laborers for summer 
detasseling work. Representatives from DeKalb contacted the 
county extension agents in Page and Fremont Counties, hoping 
to locate approximately 500 detasselers. The prospect for 
finding summer workers to detassel looked bleak. Due to the 
lack of a vailable local help and taking into consideration the 
large number of workers needed, the county extension agents 
affirmed the definite need for POW labor. DeKalb then 
contracted with the United States Army for the establishment 
of a temporary side camp, under the administration of a larger 
main camp, to house POWs that would be located at the old 
Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) camp near Shenandoah. 
During the months of July and August 1943, Camp Weingarten, 
(Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1955 ) , 76-78, 362; Edward 
J. Pluth, "Prisoner of War Employment in Minnesota During World War 
II," Minnesota History, 44 (Winter 1975): 302; Arthur 
Lobdell,"Report from A.T. Lobdell to Governor Dwight Griswold 9 
January 1947," Algona POW camp vertical file, Algona Public Library. 
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Mi ssouri, sent approximat el y 300 Ita l ian POW s t o Shenandoah. 
These POWs handled the maj o r share of De Kalb 's de t asse ling 
work, which freed many local laborers for employment by other 
h ybrid seed producers in the area. 11 
In 1943 Italian POWs were also employed on the Adams 
ranch near Odebolt in Sac County, Iowa. Comprised of 6,400 
acres, the Adams ranch was the largest farm in the state. 
This farm had 2,800 acres of corn, 270 acres of flax, 685 
acres of oats, 1,065 acres in tame hay, 1,040 acres of red 
clover, and 10 acres of potatoes with the remaining acres in 
pasture. According to the Sac County Extension Director, 
Kenneth Littlefield, several attempts had failed to get labor 
from a c onscientious objector camp. The Italian POWs shocked 
and threshed 2,100 acres of grain on the Adams ranch which 
otherwise would have rotted in the fields. Finally, 200 
Italian prisoners of war worked in a hemp plant for two months 
near Eldora, Iowa, in late 1943. 12 Although local farmers had 
solved their labor problems the farm labor emergency in Iowa 
was just beginning. 
11 Annual Narrative Reports, Page County Ex tension Office, 1943, 
7; Clarinda Herald Journal, 9 August 1943. 
12Annual Narrative Reports, Page County Extension Office, 1943, 
3-7; Annual Narrative Reports, Sac County Extension Office, 1943, 9; 
Algona Upper Des Moines, 29 July 1943; Eldora Ledger Herald, 6 
December 1945. 
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The fu t ure o f I owa's agricultural contribution t o the war 
effort depended on t he a vailabil ity and acquisition o f a 
reliable local supply of labor. Large farm operations and 
businesses like DeKalb and the Adams ranch annually utilized 
large numbers of workers. These workers often included 
migrants shipped from Mexico . Subsequentl y , large operations 
gained experience in finding alternative supplies of farm 
workers. Farmers with average size operations, however, 
struggled to find alternatives. Although enemy prisoners of 
war appeared to be perfect candidates to relieve the farm 
labor shortage, bureaucratic guidelines would initially make 
their use nearly impossible. 
In February 1944, soon after the opening of the Algona 
and Clarinda encampments, camp officials made announcements 
regarding prisoner-of-war employment. Additionally, the War 
Manpower Commission declared that POWs could only be employed 
through the local United States Employment Service office. 
Therefore, employers had to place a legitimate order for the 
workers needed with their local employment office to make sure 
that labor was not available. Farmer requests for 
agricultural laborers were then placed with the local 
extension office, or in some cases with local emergency labor 
associations. If either office determined that local labor 
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c ou l d n o t fulf i ll t h e l a bo r need, a certificate of need fo r 
POW employment was issued, which then required approval by the 
Regional Director of the War Manpower Commission. Eventually 
wage hearings were held regarding the payment of the prisoners 
used in farm, nursery, and industrial work. 13 
Employment of POW workers required that no local labor 
existed and payment needed to be comparable to that of the 
going rate for local labor, generally fifty to sixty cents per 
hour for POWs employed in agricultural labor and approximately 
eight cents more for nursery work. The farmers then paid the 
federal government for the use of their labor, and the 
government in turn paid the prisoners. Hoping that this labor 
would be available for spring farm work in southwestern Iowa 
and northwestern Missouri, by April 1944 nearly thirty 
applications from farmers had been received by the Page County 
extension agent's office. 14 Obtaining the prisoner labor, 
however, soon became nearly impossible. Farmers had to 
contact the county extension office, which contacted the War 
Manpower Commission, which contacted the camp commander who 
then approved of the labor request. Farmers eagerly 
13 Algona Upper Des Moines, 22 February 1944. 
14 Clarinda Herald Journal, 10 April and 1 June 1944. 
anticipating shipments of German POWs quickly became 
discouraged. 
Intricate and languid procurement procedures forced the 
War Department to institute an easier method to obtain POW 
labor. In March 1944, the War Department allowed the 
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Agricultural Extension Service to act as the official arbiter 
between farmers and POW camp authorities. Page County 
extension agent Merril Langfitt wasted little time putting 
this decision to good use. On 20 April 1944, the Clarinda 
Herald Journal announced the creation of the Page County 
Agricultural Emergency Labor Association headed by Langfitt. 
This association expedited the procurement of prisoners of war 
for farm labor near Clarinda. The organization assumed all 
bureaucratic formalities required in POW hiring, so that 
individual farmers in need of immediate help could make their 
needs known without doing the paperwork and waiting for 
clearance through the Labor Supply Office of the Army, County 
Extension Service, and War Labor Board. The Page County 
Agricultural Emergency Labor Association signed a contract 
with the camp for a certain number of "man days," or the 
eight-hour working day of a prisoner. By purchasing "man 
days" ahead of time, they established a reservoir of labor 
available to local farmers upon demand. When in need of 
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agricu l t u ral labor, the farmer app l ied t o the Agricultural 
Emergency Labor Association, signed regulation agreements, 
traveled to the camp to pick up the POWs and paid the 
government later. As farmers and camp officials alike became 
more familiar with the process, farmers would call the camp a 
day in advance announcing their labor needs for the following 
day. To quell objections from local labor leaders, 
regulations stated that proof be shown that no local labor 
existed, such as bringing a copy of an advertisement placed in 
a local paper requesting help. 15 
Despite the new War Department procedures, considerable 
planning and effort went into POW procurement. Initially , 
Kossuth County farmers often had to give the county extension 
agent, A. L. Brown, notice of need thirty days in advance . In 
September 1944, in order to prevent such delays, Lieutenant 
Colonel Lobdell encouraged farmers to form associations with 
neighbors, similar to that created by Page County farmers 
earlier that April. In these farmer associations, one farmer 
would procure a large number of POWs and then share them with 
15 Terry Paul Wilson, "The Afrika Korps in Oklahoma: F6rt 
Reno's POW Compound," Chronicles of Oklahoma 52 (Fall 1974): 363-64; 
Krammer, Nazi Prisoners of War in America, 89; Clarinda Herald 
Journal, 2 February, 13 March, 6, 10, and 20 April, 1 June, and 3 
July 1944; Annual Narrative Reports, Page County Extension Office, 
1944, 7. 
his ne i ghbors, all owing labor t o be availab l e when needed. 
Fu r t hermore, in early 1945 the Kossuth County Farm Bureau 
entered into a contract as employer, making procurement 
easier. 1 6 
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The majority of POW labor requests occurred when no local 
labor existed and farmers could organize to appl y for at least 
ten prisoners. Groups of ten or more prisoners could be 
divided as long as they were kept within a three-mile radius 
of each other and could be seen by a guard every hour. 
Regulations required farmer-employers to provide 
transportation for the guard enabling him to check on the 
POWs. Rules such as these eventually disappeared as a 
consistent routine developed between the camp, prisoners, and 
the farmer-employers. Dorothy Johnson, who helped her husband 
farm 1,215 acres of tillable land approximately three miles 
northeast of Clarinda, stated that after a relatively short 
period of time the guard drove his own jeep, checking on the 
POWs only periodically. Farmers transported the prisoners to 
and from camp in all cases, although they received credit of 
one cent per mile by the United States government for each POW 
16 Algona Upper Des Moines, 24 October 1944; Annual Narrative 
Reports, Kossuth County Extension Office, 1945, 6. 
transported. 17 These policies shed light on the working 
relationship that developed between local farmers and the 
enemy POWs since the Germans received the treatment of hired 
hands as opposed to prisoners. During the 1944 season, 
prisoner-of-war labor performed many farm tasks throughout 
Iowa. 
The first German POWs contracted for work outside their 
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camp in Iowa labored in the nurseries of Shenandoah, 
cultivating plants, grass, trees, shrubs, and flowers for 
transplanting. Adverse weather conditions in the early spring 
and an insufficient supply of free labor slowed fieldwork for 
the Mount Arbor and Shenandoah nurseries, prompting the 
nurseries to contract for POW labor. Throughout 1944, 
nurseries in Shenandoah employed between twenty and seventy 
German prisoners per day during their spring busy season, with 
Camp Clarinda supplying both meals and guards for the POWs. 18 
Prisoner-of-war labor, during the 1944 season, however, 
entailed more than nursery work. 
17 Clarinda Herald Journal, 3 July 1944; Des Moines Register, 8 
October 1944; Dorothy Johnson, interview with the author, Clarinda, 
Iowa, 21 March 2000. 
18 Clarinda Herald Journal, 20 and 27 April 1944, and 8 
February 1945. 
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Prisoner-of-war labor would prove to be invaluable 
because the War Food Administration set high food production 
goals for 1944. The Kossuth County extension office set goals 
of 239,000 acres of corn, 78,000 acres of soybeans, 11,000 
acres of flax, and 120,300 acres of oats. 19 Kossuth County 
farmers used German POWs for general farm labor, such as 
tractor driving, utilizing teams of horses, hauling, silo 
filling, harvesting seed corn, and working in potato fields in 
addition to nursery work. Near Algona, farmers used POW labor 
exclusively for haying, harvesting, corn detasseling, and silo 
filling. Farmers generally used German POWs in groups of five 
to ten, although the Sherman Nursery near Charles City 
employed fifty German prisoners daily. During the month of 
August 1944, thirty-eight Kossuth County farmers employed 
German prisoners of war, including 174 POWs that pulled weeds 
near Humboldt in August. 20 
Contract work in Page County included clearing roots and 
stumps from hedgerows, tile ditch digging, laying out of tile 
ditch surveys, hauling manure, fence building, and tree 
19 Algona Upper Des Moines, 9 December 1943. 
20 Ibid., 12 September and 24 September 1944; Kossuth County 
Advance, 2 November 1944; Provost Marshal General's Inspection 
Report, G, 7-9 September 1944, copies provided to author by Mr. 
George Lobdell, Lt. Col. Arthur Lobdell's nephew; Annual Narrative 
Reports, Humboldt County Extension Office, 1944, 12. 
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planting. Prisoners also labored in hay harvest, c orn 
detasseling, and other miscellaneous farm j obs. In May 1944, 
directly west of Page County, Fremont County growers used POWs 
to help harvest more than 400 acres of asparagus. Fremont 
County farmers used more POW labor to assist in pea and sweet 
corn harvest, in addition to corn detasseling. Due to the 
distance from the camp, Fremont County farmers used the POWs 
for only six and one-half to seven hours per day, since 
regulations allowed the prisoners to work no longer than eight 
hours daily including transportation. Due to the lack of 
available German POWs, prisoner labor filled approximately 10 
percent of the labor shortage in Fremont County. Harley 
Walker, the Fremont County extension service agent, said that 
these men were "mostly young, sturdy fellows, who worked best 
if supervised by one foreman from their group." 21 
German prisoners of war engaged in more than farm labor 
activities outside the camps, they also combated natural 
disasters. Between April and June 1944, German POW work 
details averted flooding along the Missouri River in southwest 
Iowa. The first flood crisis that summoned POW labor took 
place near McPaul. In April 1944, prisoner-of-war details 
21 Clarinda Herald Journal, 4 May and 3 July 1944; Annual 
Narrative Reports, Page County Extension Office, 1944, 2; Quote in 
Annual Narrative Reports, Fremont County Extension Office, 1944, 15. 
we re s ent out fr om Cl arinda in s ix- hou r s hift s to r e p a i r a 
dike o n the Miss ouri near Ne b raska City. An e ven g r eater 
crisis occurred in June 1944 near Hamburg, Iowa, when POWs 
assisted the Army Corps of Engineers in closing a 200-foot 
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breach in one of thirteen levees along the river. Twelve-hour 
shifts with 100 German prisoners in each shift worked for 
seven hours, which is all that regulations would al l ow, 
leaving five hours for transportation to and from the site. 
Two American officers, a group of NCOs, an interpreter, and 
medical personnel, including two German medical technicians 
serving as first aid men, accompanied the POWs. Railroad men 
at Hamburg stated that the flood, which carried away 200 feet 
of mainline Burlington track, was the most devastating the 
area had seen. With the situation under control, the Army 
engineers commented that POW labor saved 12,800 acres of 
farmland and the entire town of Percival. 22 
Storm damage in May 1944 brought about the formation of 
the Pocahontas County Storm Emergency Association. The 
Association contracted with Camp Algona for the use of twenty 
German prisoners for thirty-four farmers to clean up storm 
damage. In September Camp Algona had a contract with the 
Concrete Tile Company in Humboldt where the POWs laid tile. 
22 Clarinda Herald Journal, 20 April, 12 June, and 19 June 
1944. 
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The y were transported to and from the camp fifty mi l es every 
day. German prisoners were a l so employed in Algona's hemp 
plant. The Algona hemp plant's labor crisis became acute in 
October 1944 when school opened and the labor supply dwindled. 
Under mill and guard supervision the POWs worked the night 
shift. The Kossuth County Advance announced that prisoners 
would not work at the same time as civilians, and employer 
payment for the prisoner labor would be sixty cents per hour. 
The POWs played a vital role in this industry because the 
local hemp crop averaged three tons of hemp per acre. The 
processed hemp was issued by the government in thousands of 
yards to battleships for anchorage and towing purposes. The 
tensile strength of this hemp rope was greater than sisal 
r9pe, it was easier to handle, and had greater resiliency. 
Provost Marshal General bi-weekly reports for 1944 indicate 
twelve contractors employing POWs for industrial work from 
September 1944 to January 1945. 23 
Industrial employment contrasted agricultural employment 
in a few key areas. Industrial employers were required to pay 
social security and unemployment taxes in addition to carrying 
23 Annual Narrative Reports, Pocahontas County Extension 
Office, 1944, 12; Kossuth County Advance, 26 October and 16 November 
1944; Provost Marshal General's Inspection Report, Tab G, 15 August, 
15 September, and 15 January 1944, copies provided to author by Mr. 
George Lobdell, Lt. Col . Arthur Lobdell's nephew. 
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disability compensation for American workmen. Industrial 
employers were also required to pay the equivalent amount to 
the government for prisoner-of-war labor. The prevailing wage 
was generally fifty to sixty cents per day, plus 12.3 percent 
to cover these expenses. 24 Camp officials took great care not 
to offend local union leaders. Therefore, German POWs were 
only employed in industries and locations with relatively weak 
union support. Locations with strong union support were 
avoided. John W. Rath of Rath Packing Company in Waterloo 
wanted to discuss using POWs to alleviate the critical labor 
shortage in his plant. Unfortunately camp officials were 
hesitant to use POWs due to strong labor unions in that city. 
Lieutenant Colonel Lobdell's hesitation stemmed from intense 
union objections to the use of German POWs at Camp Algona 
branch camps in several industries in northern Minnesota. 25 
To supply prisoner-of-war labor to locations that needed 
the workers most sometimes required the establishment of 
temporary branch camps. In February 1944, the War Department 
adopted a "calculated risk" policy that permitted the movement 
24 Des Moines Register, 8 October 1944. 
25 Lyle T. Lawson, Field Liaison Officer, "Report to Prisoner 
of War Base Camp, Algona, Iowa," September 1944, Algona Prisoner of 
War Camp Vertical File, Algona Public Library, 7-9. For a detailed 
account of labor protest to Algona Branch Camps in Minnesota, see 
Edward J. Pluth, "Prisoner of War Employment in Minnesota." 
63 
of POWs from large base camps to smaller, less secure branch 
camps. Branch camps under the administration of Camp Clarinda 
operated in Iowa, Kansas, and Nebraska during 1944. 
Lieutenant Colonel Ball, the second and final commander of 
Camp Clarinda, estimated in October 1944 that from 150 to 225 
German prisoners were engaged in farm work in small groups. 
In Hannibal, Missouri, two hundred prisoners sorted used army 
boots for distribution to liberated countries, 125 dehydrated 
alfalfa in Liberty, Missouri, 200 constructed a veterans 
hospital in Wadsworth, Kansas, 20 canned corn in Wapello, 
Iowa, and 80 did construction work in Audubon, Iowa. Branch 
camps functioned effectively in Orrick and Independence, 
Missouri, Clinton, Iowa, and West Point, Nebraska. 26 
Throughout 1944 and 1945 Camp Algona administered thirty-
four branch camps in four states: Minnesota, South Dakota, 
North Dakota, and Iowa. 27 The number of branch camps operating 
at one time in Iowa ranged from two camps in September 1944 to 
eleven camps by mid-1945. Although branch camps generally 
employed German prisoners in relatively small numbers, ranging 
26 Merrill R. Pritchett and William Shea, "Afrika Korps in 
Arkansas, 1943-1946," Arkansas Historical Quarterly 37 (Spring 
1978): 32; Des Moines Register, 8 October 1944; Clarinda Herald 
Journal, 19 June and 13 November 1944. 
27 Prisoner of War Camp, Algona, Iowa, Post Engineer's Office, 
"Branch Camps; Operations and Activities Map," November 1945. 
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from forty-nine to more than two hundred, establishing branch 
camps allowed valuable labor to be utilized where it was 
needed the most. 
During the 1944 farm season Algona branch camps were 
erected in Eldora, Waverly, and Charles City, Iowa. Charles 
City's branch camp was relatively small, with between forty-
nine and fifty-eight POWs performing work for the Sherman 
Nursery Company. The branch camp established in Hardin 
County, near Eldora 113 miles from Algona, housed between 161 
and 175 POWs beginning in August 1944. The Marshall Canning 
Company made arrangements with the Army and the president of 
the County Fair Association, Henry Janssen, to use the 
fairgrounds and former CCC buildings to house 175 German POWs. 
According to Walter B. Eyre, Hardin County Extension Director, 
the 1944 farm season would experience a labor shortage, which 
would be "the most serious in the history of the county.u 
These prisoners worked in the company's canning factories in 
Marshalltown, Ackley, Hampton, Grundy Center, and Reinbeck. 
Labor also included canning for Western Grocery Company, hemp 
processing for both the Hemp Growers Co-op and War Hemp 
Industries, and farm work for the Grundy Elevator. According 
to Harold Shaw, a sergeant at the Eldora branch camp, "The men 
do any work that is required. . If we want an electrician, 
the clerk looks over his roll and goes out and summons his 
man." Moreover, prisoners of war in Eldora constructed a 
local rural electrification line. 28 
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The Iowa town of Waverly, 120 miles from Algona in Bremer 
County, also benefited from the establishment of a branch camp 
in 1944. Beginning 15 August 1944 and ending 25 October 1944 
the Waverly branch camp housed an average of eighty-three 
German prisoners of war. German POWs were housed in the YWCA 
camp lodge near Janesville, five miles south of Waverly. A 
six-foot barbed wire fence surrounded fourteen tents. The 
Marshall Canning Company employed German POWs at their canning 
plant in Waverly and the Waverly Independent Republican 
reported on 16 August 1944 that in seven and one-half hours 
German prisoners aided in the canning of 5,000 cases of corn. 
Prisoners of war also performed miscellaneous work for a 
number of local farmers, especially J. Roach and Sons. 
28 Charles City Press, 14 October 1944; Henry Janssen Quote in 
Annual Narrative Reports, Hardin County Extension Office, 1944, 21; 
Eldora Herald Ledger 10, 17, and 31 August, and 7 September 1944; 
Algona Upper Des Moines, 10 October 1944; "Bi-monthly Algona 
Prisoner of War Camp Labor Reports," August-December 1944, copies 
provided to author by Mr. George Lobdell, Lt. Col. Arthur Lobdell's 
nephew. 
Re po r t s ind icated t hat t he " me n did g ood wo r k a nd [t h e 
program] was a success."29 
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Merril Langfitt, with the help of the Page County Farm 
Labor Office, coordinated the 1944 agricultural labor program 
for southwest Iowa while A. L. Brown and the Kossuth County 
Farm Labor Committee coordinated north central Iowa. The farm 
labor offices could not meet the demand for farm laborers 
throughout 1944. Langfitt added, "The amount of civil i an help 
a vailable this past summer amounted to practically nothing, 
and with the exception of the help used for our one large 
seasonal crop, hybrid seed corn, civilian labor recruited and 
placed during the 1944 season was so small that its effect on 
the total labor situation in the county was so small that it 
c ould be eliminated entirely." 30 Prisoner-of-war labor proved 
to be especially valuable for short term or seasonal work, as 
these POWs helped harvest and process a record crop for 
Kossuth County. According to Brown, regarding the use of 
foreign labor, one hundred Mexican nationals were used for the 
sugar beet harvest. Unfortunately these foreign workers 
29 Waverly Independent Republican, 9, 16, and 30 August, and 6 
September 1944; "Bi-monthly Algona Prisoner of War Camp Labor 
Reports," August-December 1944. 
30Annual Narrative Reports, Page County Extension Office, 1944, 
8 . 
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arrived too late in the season to adequately remedy the labor 
shortage. For the 1945 harvest season, Iowa's farmers would 
rely even more heavily on prisoner-of-war labor. 31 
Although difficulties existed, the Iowa POW labor program 
in 1944 was a success. Early in the season procurement proved 
difficult, and only farmers within a radius of fifteen to 
thirty miles of the camp benefited from the labor. Due to 
rationed gasoline, rubber tires, and the relative lack of 
branch camps in 1944, merely 60 percent of POWs were employed 
nationally through February. Nonetheless, in the months of 
June, July, and August 1944, 963 farm labor placements were 
made in Page County, accounting for 12,491 man-days of 
prisoner labor used by sixty farmer-employers. Of the total 
man-days of prisoner labor used in agriculture, 5,158 man-days 
were used by hybrid seed companies for detasseling seed corn, 
with the remaining 7,333 man-days used in agricultural work in 
nurseries and general operations on individual farms. 32 In 
Kossuth County alone, more than 100 farmers used German POWs 
during the 1944 season. The local numbers would gradually 
increase with the creation of additional branch camps and 
31 Annual Narrative Reports, Kossuth County Extension Office, 
1944, 6. 
32 Annual Narrative Reports, Page County Extension Office, 
1944, 2-9. 
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familiarity with the procurement process. Through May 1944 
the number of employed POWs had grown to 72.8 percent of all 
POWs nationally, and to 91.3 percent by April 1945. 33 The lack 
of civilian help may have had a devastating effect on the 
county's economy had prisoner-of-war labor not been available. 
In the spring of 1945 more farm workers were needed in 
northern Iowa than a year earlier. On 25 January 1945 the 
Algona Upper Des Moines announced that the state AAA set a 
2,000-acre quota for Kossuth County sugar beet growers. 
According to AAA officials, Kossuth County had the best sugar 
beet soil in Iowa. Out of a 5,000-acre total for Iowa, 
Kossuth planned for 2,000 acres. Due to the unavailability of 
sugar beet labor, Kossuth County only grew 400 acres in 1944. 
Tbe yield averaged ten tons per acre, and in 1944 there were 
337 pounds of raw sugar per ton of beets. Prior to 1945, the 
county extension director noted that Mexican nationals 
harvested the crop, but according to the state AAA their labor 
"has been undependable and has arrived too late and left too 
early."34 Additionally, Mexican labor proved available only 
for large-scale growers. Since the AAA feared that a shortage 
33Lewis and Mewha, History of Prisoner of War Utilization, 125; 
Annual Narrative Reports, Kossuth County Extension Office, 1944, 6. 
34 Algona Upper Des Moines, 25 January 1945. 
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of labor would deter sugar beet growers, the Crystal Sugar 
Company of Mason City, the c hairman of the State Sugar Beet 
Growers Association, and the Kossuth chairman of the AAA 
called on Lieutenant Colonel Lobdell concerning the possible 
use of German prisoners of war. Lobdell declared that 
providing adequate German POWs would be no problem, and 
remarked, "Many of the PWs are from sections of Germany where 
sugar beets are the principle [sic] crop, and are 
experienced." 35 Increased production goals forced local 
farmers to contemplate the use of POW labor to ensure a 
successful farm season. 
Because the employment of German prisoners during the 
1944 season proved successful, POW labor again was utilized 
when needed during the 1945 season. In January 1945 900 acres 
of hemp remained unharvested near Eldora. The local hemp 
plant had contracted POW labor through the spring, and German 
POWs could be seen loading and unloading hemp in knee-deep 
snow. In addition, the Kossuth County AAA had set a flax 
production goal at 9,000 acres for 1945. In March the Algona 
Upper Des Moines reported that the flax goal was short by 
4,000 acres. In some areas the lack of labor had led to 
serious delays in harvest, therefore flax producers feared the 
35 Ibid. 
labor shortage and were hesitant to p l ant the necessary 
acreage. 36 As in the case of sugar beets, farmers employed 
prisoner-of-war labor to help ease this predicament. 
The spring of 1945 witnessed POW workers hauling manure, 
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tiling, and making hay into the summer. Kossuth County's Farm 
Bureau once more entered into a contract as employer in order 
to establish a labor pool for local farmers, eliminating some 
of the bureaucracy in the procurement process. Kossuth 
farmers continued to utilize prisoner-of-war labor in the 
sugar beet harvest during the 1945 season. L.A. Nitz, for 
example, drove to Algona each morning and hauled twenty-six 
German POWs to assist with his sugar beet crop. A September 
1945 article in the Fort Dodge Messenger reported additional 
work completed by German POWs from Camp Algona. According to 
this report POWs engaged in clearing trees and brush from 
roadsides where roadwork was being conducted in addition to 
gathering wood as a coal conservation method. 37 Favorable 
local acceptance and a more efficient procurement process 
encouraged the establishment of additional branch camps 
36 Eldora Ledger Herald, 25 January 1945; Algona Upper Des 
Moines, 22 March 1945. 
37Annual Narrative Reports, Kossuth County Extension Office, 
1945, 6; Fort Dodge Messenger, 21 July 1945; Algona Upper Des 
Moines, 25 October 1945. 
throughout Iowa in 1945 to aid in the alleviation of labor 
shortages. 
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Camp Algona served as the administrative headquarters to 
eight more branch camps in various Iowa locations during 1945. 
Branch camps were established to serve labor requirements in 
Shenandoah and Tabor, located in southwest Iowa. These side 
camps were eventually placed under Camp Clarinda's control. 
Camp Algona's side camps were located near Clinton, Muscatine, 
Onawa, Storm Lake, and Toledo while branch camps near Eldora, 
Waverly, and Charles City continued to function as they had in 
1944. 38 
Clinton's branch camp, 285 miles from Algona in eastern 
Iowa, began operation in February 1945. In the fall of 1944 
prisoners of war worked in Clinton when Italian POWs from Camp 
Weingarten, Missouri, performed post maintenance at Shick 
General Hospital before being sent back to Missouri. Sixty-
five German prisoners of war arrived in Clinton to establish a 
temporary branch camp and work in the Pillsbury Feed Mill, 
where they were employed until September. According to the 
Clinton Herald, "They do not engage in any Heil Hitler's while 
38
"Branch Camps; Operations and Activities Map," November 1945; 
Clarinda Herald Journal, 19 September 1945. 
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the y are POWs. The y are a quiet and subdued lot, but are kept 
under careful guard 24 hours a day." 39 
The H. J. Heinz Company of Muscatine employed 237 German 
laborers beginning in April and continuing through the peak of 
the detasseling season, warranting the establishment of a side 
camp. An average of seventy-five POWs were employed by the 
Heinz Co. through the remainder of the summer and fall months 
in food processing. In western Iowa, 158 miles from Algona 
near Onawa, another branch camp formed. In April between 80 
and 100 Germans began performing flood control along the 
Missouri River, and remained through September. An additional 
123 German POWs set up camp in Toledo, Iowa, 160 miles 
southeast of Algona where they worked in the local canning 
plant. Erection of the last "new" Algona branch camp took 
place in August eighty-two miles west of Algona in Storm Lake. 
One hundred and thirty eight Germans were located in Storm 
Lake, seventy-five of them used for picking snap beans, 
canning in the plant, and pulling weeds by the Atlantic 
Canning Company. The remaining German prisoners worked for 
the Sac City Canning Corporation and again at the Adams Ranch 
near Odebolt during the threshing season and in the shelling 
of old corn at the ranch. Sixty POWs pulled cockleburs and 
39 Clinton Herald, 15 October 1945. 
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weeds in groups of approximately fifteen on six teen Sac County 
farms. Employers paid the government sixty cents per hour for 
POW labor in detasseling, while picking snap beans, potatoes, 
and snapping sweet corn cost two cents per pound, eight cents 
per bushel and three dollars per ton respectively. According 
to officials from the Sac City Canning Company , the POWs gav e 
"very satisfactory service. 11 40 
Valuable work continued at Algona's three other branch 
camps in Charles City, Waverly, and Eldora. Floyd County 
Extension Director, W. H. Brown, noted that most requests for 
help could not be met. Brown coordinated the use of forty 
German POWs from the Charles City camp to help four local snap 
bean growers. These German laborers worked for 4,304 man-
hours, picking 77,017 pounds of beans. Floyd County farmers, 
according to Brown, "were well satisfied with their work and 
preferred this source of labor to the boys and girls who 
required more supervision." Bremer County's branch camp at 
Waverly continued to utilize POW labor. Sixty German 
prisoners were employed on three or four occasions to help 
40 Prisoner of War Labor Report, 7th Service Command, Army 
Service Forces, 21 July and 15 September 1945; Annual Narrative 
Reports, Muscatine County Extension Office, 1945, 6; Onawa Weekly 
Democrat, 12 July 1945; Toledo Chronicle, 16 and 30 August 1945; 
Annual Narrative Reports, Buena Vista County Extension Office, 1945, 
6-7; Quote in Annual Narrative Reports, Sac County Extension Office, 
1945, 39-40. 
pick beans, and the Marshall Canning Company continued to 
employ between 100 and 110 laborers. Although the canning 
plant employed just sixty POWs in 1944, all of them in the 
plant itself, this season approximately eighty worked in the 
plant and thirty more labored in the canning company's 
fields. 41 
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Finally, according to E. I. Rosenberger, Harding County 
Extension Director, despite some disappointment with the 
complicated procurement procedures, the German prisoner-of-war 
camp at Eldora provided "valuable assistance to the farm labor 
program during 1945." Eldora made 300 POWs available, while 
an average of 85 were employed at any given time. At the peak 
of the sweet corn harvesting season, the Marshall Canning 
C9mpany used 75 Germans. Several Hardin County farmers 
employed prisoners during July to help with the harvest and 
other seasonal work. Prisoners of war labored near the Hardin 
County towns of Hubbard, New Providence, Radcliffe and Iowa 
Falls. For example, three farmers used POWs to shock oats and 
three others used them for weeding on their farms. An 
41 Annual Narrative Reports, Floyd County Extension Office, 
1945, 1-11; Waverly Independent Republican, 11 July and 8 August 
1945; Annual Narrative Reports, Bremer County Extension Office, 
1945, 25-26. 
additional eight German laborers were supplied to the county 
fairgrounds to help get ready for the 1945 county fair. 42 
Camp Algona's labor program continued to be successful 
throughout the 1945 season. Local acceptance as well as 
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familiarity with the procurement procedures allowed the labor 
program to grow and reach to nearly all corners of the state. 
According to Kossuth County Extension Director, A. L. Brown, 
no farmer had to let any crops go unharvested, and "POW labor 
was used almost exclusively in filling orders for adult 
workers. 11 While 100 Kossuth County farmers employed German 
POWs in 1944, more than 200 employed them in 1945. Brown 
remarked that their "work was most satisfactory and farmers 
found that they rather liked the idea of having a greater 
number of men for a few days, rather than one man for several 
days. 1143 
Commanding Officer Lt. Col. Arthur Lobdell summarized the 
success of Camp Algona's labor program by saying, "The work 
done by these prisoners increases production and helps shorten 
the war. 11 The number of prisoners at Camp Algona varied given 
the rate of turnover between camps was often high. In twenty-
42 Annual Narrative Reports, Hardin County Extension Office, 
1945, 6-8; Eldora Ledger Herald, 19 April, 2, August, 27 September, 
25 October, and 6 December 1945. 
43 First quote in Brown, Annual Narrative Reports, Kossuth 
County Extension Office, 1945, 6-11; Second quote Ibid., 1944, 6. 
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eight months, Camp Algona and its branch camps housed 10,000 
Germans, averaging 3,261 per month. The types of work 
performed in the twenty-eight months were: logging 15 percent; 
agriculture 20 percent; factory 35 percent; government work at 
Sioux Falls Air Base, Missouri River, and other camps 30 
percent. From June 1944 to February 1945, main and branch 
camp prisoners of war completed 105,000 man-days of labor, and 
Camp Algona received $504,000. The POWs received a total of 
$680,000 in coupons for their work. The amount paid to the 
federal government for their labor was considerable, payment 
that otherwise would have been given to civilian laborers. 
According to Lobdell, "The value of the labor to the men 
hiring them was $3,506,000, made up of $2,406,000 from private 
employees and $1,100,000 from the government." Lobdell 
estimated that the wholesale value of the food and other 
products "handled" that otherwise would not have been was 
$101,000,000. 44 
Farmers reported their satisfaction with the quality of 
labor they received from German prisoners, and believed the 
POWs could turn out a good days work. Prisoners performed 
best on jobs that required a minimum of training and skills. 
Eventually the prisoners arrived at local farms and were 
44 First quote in Algona Upper Des Moines, 3 May 1945; Lobdell, 
"Report to Governor Dwight Griswold." 
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viewed more like common laborers than prisoners of war. Dick 
Norton, whose father employed German POWs on his farm, noted, 
"My father had hired a group of them to pull the cockleburs in 
the bean fields. The guard, I discovered when I took some 
cold soft drinks out to them, was asleep between the bean 
rows." Algona's Camp commander, Lt. Col. Arthur Lobdell, 
stated, "most of the Germans preferred hard, routine manual 
labor 10 to 12 hours a day. In many places we worked around 
the clock, two shifts 12 hours each." 45 One farmer who 
neglected to instruct the POWs found them pulling soybeans 
instead of weeds because they did not know the difference. 
Eventually local farmers picked up the German laborers at the 
camp without guards, and upon arrival the prisoners often 
drove the farmer's vehicle to specific work locations. Vera 
Wellhausen, who farmed with her husband approximately eight 
miles southwest of Clarinda, commented that the POWs rarely 
caused problems. If the German prisoners ever complained they 
were told they could always be sent back to camp, a suggestion 
the prisoners invariably declined. Albert Wellhausen said, 
45Lewis and Mewha, History of Prisoner of War Utilization, 128; 
First quote in "A Collection of Memories of the Algona Prisoner of 
War Camp, 1943-1946," Vertical File, Algona Public Library, December 
1994; Second quote in Lobdell, "Report Governor Dwight Griswold." 
"they were mostly good workers," and he considered one in 
particular the best laborer he had ever employed. 46 
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Like American labor, some German prisoner-of-war workers 
performed well and some did not, depending upon experience. 
Mike Loss of Algona, who farmed on a large scale, observed 
that although his last group lacked experience many of them 
were among his best workers. According to Loss, some of the 
Germans he hired had no money to buy tobacco when they first 
came to work for him so he bought them each a corncob pipe and 
a pouch of tobacco. Walt Bosworth, also of Algona, used some 
POWs for silo filling and said they were "good workers and had 
no problems with them." Algonan Jim Fitzpatrick, a camp guard 
who went out on many work details, commented, "The prisoners 
were easy to handle and caused us no trouble. They were happy 
to be here as they were treated well and had good living 
conditions and good food." 47 
Farmers commonly employed the same German prisoners and 
some developed lasting relationships with them. Not only did 
these farmers need POW labor, they depended upon the Germans. 
46 Des Moines Register, 8 October 1944; Vera Wellhausen, 
interview with the author, Clarinda, Iowa 21 March 2000. 
47 First quote in "A Collection of Memories of the Algona 
Prisoner of War Camp, 1943-1946"; Lobdell, "Report to Governor 
Dwight Griswold"; Algona Upper Des Moines, 10 October 1944; Des 
Moines Register, 8 October 1944. 
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This dependence often turned into friendship. Gerald Haas, 
twelve years old when his parents employed POWs near Algona, 
remarked, "Farm labor was short during this period. My family 
hired some prisoners to pull and cut weeds on our land. They 
had a guard with them, but mostly he sat on the end of the 
field waiting for them to finish the job. My morn always 
cooked and fed them their noon meal and as a result they 
worked very well for us." 48 Dorothy Johnson recalls an 
occasion when her husband was forced to leave home and tend to 
a sick relative, and rather than fear for the welfare of his 
farm, he said, "Bruno will know what to do." Bruno was a 
German POW who spent the better part of a year working for the 
Johnson's. 49 
Prisoners played with farmer's children, brought them 
food and candy and told stories of their own children back 
home. German laborers even ate at the same table as the 
farmer's family and became quite fond of American farm 
cooking. So fond that the POWs began telling the guards which 
farmers they wished to labor for. One Page County farmer lost 
48 "A Collection of Memories of the Algona Prisoner of War 
Camp, 1943-1946," Vertical File, Algona Public Library, December 
1994. 
8 ' Dorothy Johnson, interview with the author, Clarinda, Iowa, 
21 March 2000. 
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the ability to contract POW labor after he took two German 
prisoners to lunch in a restaurant on the square in Clarinda, 
a violation of camp regulations. 5 0 Such a unique relationship 
developed between farmers and their captive laborers that at 
times it became difficult to tell they were enemies. One Page 
County farmer remembers the German prisoners employed on her 
farm returning from the fields with reports about all the 
rabbits and pheasant they had seen. Her husband promptly told 
these German soldiers to use the old shotgun he kept in his 
truck the next time they saw game, and the POWs hunted while 
the American guard knew and allowed it. 51 
On one occasion a few Germans were brought to Constance 
Jergenson's farm to clean up her garden. Terrified, she 
discovered her three-year-old daughter in the midst of them. 
According to Jergenson, "They were boyish looking young men 
laughing and chattering in German and seemed delighted to be 
near a small child. Becky was in glory with the attention. 
When I ran to get her I realized they were harmless." 52 
5° Corinne and Wilbur Goecker, personal interview, 21 March 
2000; Clarinda Herald Journal, 30 April 1945. 
51 Dorothy Johnson, personal interview, 21 March 2000. 
~ "A Collection of Memories of the Algona Prisoner of War 
Camp, 1943-1946," Vertical File, Algona Public Library, December 
1994. 
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Jean Balgeman Shey remarked, "Five prisoners worked for 
my father during the summer. They enjoyed coming to my 
parent's farm and to eat my mother's big meals at noon." 
Balgeman's father became close to two of the Germans, and kept 
in touch with them after they returned to Germany. When one 
of the German POWs, Wilhelm Schittges, was repatriated in 
1946, her father pulled him aside and told him to write 
whenever he had hunger back in Germany. Balgeman's father 
ended up sending ten packages, and when she traveled to 
Germany to visit Schittges and his family in 1988, he told her 
that the packages "saved their lives." 53 
In September 1945 a reporter for the Algona Upper Des 
Moines interviewed a camp guard who spoke about the POW's 
opinions of America. He commented, "One, who could speak 
English fluently, still can't believe there can be so rich and 
wonderful a country as America. This former Nazi is trying 
his best to stay here, and says he never wants to return to 
the Reich." Lieutenant J. Beorlage, commander of the Toledo 
branch camp, noted, "German POWs have little desire to escape 
53 Ibid. 
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and lend themselves well to discipline." 54 The development of 
positive relationships aided the success of the labor program. 
Not all employers readily accepted the German prisoners. 
Those not able to accept the German POWs either were not happy 
with the quality of labor or could not see beyond one glaring 
fact, these men were the enemy. Herman Strathe, of Hubbard in 
Hardin County, employed twenty Germans for seed corn 
detasseling. He used them for only two days then cancelled 
the contract because the men were not thorough enough. 
Lieutenant Ted Chrischilles, an Algona native serving in 
France, wrote an article for Algona Upper Des Moines in which 
he criticized recent reports of German prisoners swimming in 
Algona's $30,000 pool. According to Lt. Chrichilles, "To me 
it doesn't make sense-i.e. a Nazi kills 20 of our boys and 
then gives up and goes to the United States to be treated like 
some American fighting man with a few privileges taken away." 55 
Wayland Hopley, president of the Iowa Beef Producers 
Association, contacted the War Department with his concerns. 
Hopley had recently attempted to use ten German POWs from Camp 
Clarinda on his Atlantic farm. He found the prisoners "surly, 
54 Algona Upper Des Moines, 20 September 1945; Toledo Chronicle, 
30 August 1945. 
55 Annual Narrative Reports, Hardin County Extension Office, 
1945, 6-8; Algona Upper Des Moines, 15 August 1944; Clarinda Herald 
Journal, 19 October 1944. 
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fostering their Nazi philosophy and uncooperative." Hopley 
sent them back to the camp, although he still needed the help. 
Reactions such as these were uncommon, yet they represent the 
understandable anti-German sentiment many Americans fostered. 
Hopley, for example, had just lost his son in the European 
Theater and to him the attitude of the German POWs meant that 
they had learned nothing, and American soldiers such as his 
son had died in vain. Despite scattered opposition, Major 
General Danielson deemed the farm labor program at Camp 
Clarinda a success, and stated that POW labor problems were 
"infinitesimal compared to the amount of work obtained." 56 
Although Camp Algona's 1945 farm labor program ended with 
a successful farming season, new information regarding Camp 
Clarinda's prisoners jeopardized the success of their farm 
labor program and the 1945 season. Early in 1945 news arrived 
that Japanese prisoners would be replacing Camp Clarinda's 
German occupants. 
56 Shenandoah Evening Sentinel, 29 September 1944; Clarinda 
Herald Journal, 19 October 1944. 
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CHAPTER 4 
JAPANESE POWS AT CAMP CLARINDA 
"Prisoner labor was a lifesaver for farmers this past season. 
Many farms would not have been run without their help. 
While more than 426,000 Axis prisoners of war lived in 
captivity in the United States during World War Two, fewer 
than 6,000 were Japanese. Only two camps housed Japanese 
soldiers in the United States, one at Camp McCoy, Wisconsin 
and the other at Camp Clarinda, Iowa, due to the relatively 
small number of Japanese soldiers taken captive in the Pacific 
Theater. Although Camp Clarinda successfully housed German 
prisoners, the internment of Japanese POWs posed problems. 
These Japanese prisoners replaced German prisoners who had 
been widely accepted by southwest Iowans. Although these 
Iowans knew about the vicious reputation of Japanese soldiers, 
they needed Japanese POWs to fill the void in the local 
agricultural labor force. Although they felt the brunt of 
racism, the Japanese at Camp Clarinda were treated remarkably 
well, and they aided in the attainment of war production goals 
for the surrounding community. 
The German prisoners lived within the confines of Camp 
Clarinda from January 1944 until January 1945, when the 
citizens of Clarinda received notification that Japanese 
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prisoners would replace Camp Clarinda's German occupants. 
Prior to the Japanese arrival the Germans labored successfully 
in the surrounding community, as the depleted local labor 
supply could not fulfill Clarinda's farm needs. The arrival 
of Japanese prisoners jeopardized the success of the camp's 
farm labor program because the surrounding community hesitated 
to employ the enemy who had led the suprise attack on Pearl 
Harbor. 
On 1 January 1945 the citizens of Clarinda learned about 
the arrival of Japanese POWs from the Clarinda Herald Journal. 
The Seventh Service Command announced the transfer of the 
Germans to other camps to make room for the Japanese arriving 
from receiving stations on the West Coast. These Japanese POWs 
arrived in an environment already hostile to those of Japanese 
descent. In April 1942, according to the Algona Upper Des 
Moines, several young Japanese-American men in Shenandoah were 
attacked and run out of town by a "mob who demanded they be 
sent to a concentration camp." These young men were recent 
graduates of Iowa State College, and the Upper Des Moines 
noted that one of them had bought a bond "to help his 
country." As a result of community sentiment, camp officials 
declared that the first 250 Japanese prisoners would not be 
used for labor outside the camp since media propaganda 
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regarding the cruelety of the Japanese soldiers had helped 
enflame the community. While local citizens expressed concern 
and with camp security heightened, the Seventh Service Command 
announced, "Cognizance has been taken of the agricultural 
labor situation in the Iowa area," and declared that the 
removal of the German prisoners would not affect the 
availability of the German captives for such work. 1 Concern 
spread among Clarinda-area farmers, the nearest camp with 
available POW labor was hours away at Camp Algona. 
Some controversy surrounds the number of Japanese 
soldiers interned in the United States. Arnold Krammer's 
findings are the most convincing. He concluded that only 
5,424 Japanese POWs arrived on American shores. Factors 
c9ntributing to such a small number of Japanese prisoners are 
cultural in origin. Japanese samurai had a lengthy tradition 
as warriors, and the samurai spirit pervaded among many 
contemporary Japanese soldiers. The Japanese Military Field 
Code commanded each Japanese soldier to remember the shame of 
capture and that soldiers should die to avoid leaving a 
dishonorable name. Soldiers were encouraged to charge enemy 
positions or save their last round of ammunition to commit 
suicide. American troops, well aware of such policies, feared 
1 Clarinda Herald Journal, 1 February 1945; Algona Upper Des 
Moines, 14 April 1942; Des Moines Register, 2 February 1945. 
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the Japanese and exhibited hesitation in taking them pris oner. 
During the Burma Campaign, f o r example, 17 ,166 Japanese 
soldiers died while only 142 succumbed to capture. If 
captured, the Japanese prisoners held fast to their honor 
code. One such prisoner stated, "We wanted to die, yet we 
couldn't die. We wanted to kill ourselves and we could not.u 
Thousands of Japanese-Americans (Nisei) had already been 
placed in internment camps soon after the bombing of Pearl 
Harbor on 7 December 1941, and news of the Japanese atrocities 
during the Bataan Death March in 1942 had reached the small 
southwestern Iowa community. Early in the Second World War 
the Japanese captured approximately 25,000 American soldiers 
and within four years all but 15,000 had died or been killed. 
Many of those deaths were attributed "premeditated, vicious, 
and inhuman actsu by Japanese soldiers. 2 This reputation, 
one filled with visions of brutality, preceded the Japanese 
POW arrival at Camp Clarinda. 
While Japanese prisoners arrived in Clarinda, the German 
POWs were shipped out. Late in January 1945, numerous 
2 Arnold Krammer, "Japanese Prisoners of War in America," 
Pacific Historical Review 52 (February 1983): 67-70 quote on 80; 
Terry Paul Wilson, "The Afrika Korps in Oklahoma: Fort Reno's POW 
Compound," Chronicles of Oklahoma 52 (Fall 1974): 362; Robert 
LaForte, Ronald Marcello, and Richard Himmel, eds., With Only The 
Will To Live: Accounts of Americans in Japanese Prison Camps, 1941-
1945, (Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1994), XXIX-79. 
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truckloads of Germans left Camp Clarinda for Camp Algona. 
Less than a week later, the first Japanese prisoners of war 
arrived. With processing complete the Japanese took their 
place behind the barbed wire enclosures. Most of the Japanese 
appeared to be between twenty and forty-five years old, and 
one-third of them were "gunzoku", or civilians attached to and 
under the rules and regulations of the army. Camp commander 
Lieutenant Colonel George Ball stated, "They were a sorry lot 
when they arrived. Some were recovering from wounds. Some 
were carrying shrapnel. They'd just come from a long duty in 
the field and they were dirty and wild as animals. We pounded 
the rudiments of sanitation into their heads, after a little 
effort, and broke up some of their child-like habits." 3 With 
processing complete POWs settled into typical daily routines. 
The Japanese prisoners, like their German predecessors, 
ate well while at Camp Clarinda. Despite the Japanese refusal 
to sign the Geneva Convention, the United States upheld its 
obligations to feed their prisoners as well as its own 
enlisted men. The Japanese cooked their own meals, which 
initially included carp, mullet, and special rolls containing 
lima beans. Lieutenant Ball described how the Japanese ate 
when he stated, "They're eating fish and rice, for a basic 
3 Des Moines Register, 8 April and 23 September 1945. 
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diet, with plain bread, a cup of coffee a day, some damn wea k 
tea and a few cheap vegetables once in a while. Fo r the most 
part these days, the Japanese are having mullets for their 
fish, and they cost us between five and six cents a pound. 
We're hoping to get squid and shark meat in the near future. 
For a while we used to give them carp, but carp was too good 
for them so we got mullets. They like them all right, so well 
in fact they eat the tails and heads to boot." 4 Some of the 
food the Japanese consumed came from the 120-acre garden they 
farmed surrounding the camp compound. The working POW ate 
3700 calories per day, which cost the United States government 
approximately $.18 per POW per day. 5 Japanese prisoners were 
also able to purchase items from the Post Exchange (PX). 
Inside the camp, the Japanese prisoners were not allowed 
the same benefits that the Germans had been given. Each 
Japanese prisoner received the mandatory payment of ten cents 
per day, with only twenty to thirty additional cents per day 
for certain types of work. Since the Japanese government had 
not signed the Geneva Treaty, the United States government 
chose not to pay the Japanese the eighty cents per day that 
4 Clarinda Herald Journal, 9 April 1945; Des Moines Register, 8 
April 1945. 
5 Des Moines Register, 23 September 1945. 
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German POWs received. Some items available at the prisoner 
canteen included low-grade tobacco for pipes and making 
cigarettes, candy, toilet articles, combs, and brushes. 
Lieutenant Colonel Ball commented that somehow the Japanese 
have discovered from seeing an occasional newspaper map of the 
Pacific that they are losing ground. "Do we ever discuss the 
trend of the war with them? Hell no. We don't care what they 
think." 6 
Lieutenant Colonel Ball wasted no time establishing his 
authority over the Japanese POWs. Little time passed before 
problems arose. Since Japan had not signed the Geneva Treaty, 
Ball made it clear that the Japanese would not receive the 
same treatment as the Germans had. Ball commented, "With 
Japanese, non-signers of the pact, we comply with the rules, 
alright, and then make them apply to the lower standard of 
living the Japanese have known." Additionally, the American 
garrison stationed at Camp Clarinda included veterans of South 
Pacific combat who harbored contempt for the Japanese 
prisoners. Yet Ball did not allow any physical punishment 
even when the Japanese stepped out of line. Ball remarked, 
"If they break any rules they go to the brig. There's no 
trial. Standard punishment is thirty days in the can, 
6 Ibid., 8 December 1945. 
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fourteen of them on bread and water, we don't get any repeat 
offenders." 7 Violation of the Geneva Convention, despite the 
Japanese refusal to sign, could have prompted retaliation 
against American POWs by the Japanese. Although Lieutenant 
Colonel Ball's policies remained within the bounds of the 
Convention, the dispensing of discipline occurred swiftl y and 
sometimes harshly. 
One such altercation took place early in the Japanese 
internment. The Japanese arrived on a particularly cold 
winter day, with plenty of ice and snow on the ground, and 
they received orders to go out and shovel. Upon the Japanese 
refusal to work in the cold weather, Lieutenant Colonel Ball 
quickly took action. According to Ball, "We sent back word to 
the effect that no work meant no food. Still they refused. 
So we got out the military police, clubs and tear gas and 
marched inside to clean out every ounce of food and every 
piece of cooking equipment. As we went in they tore out of 
the barracks like so many monkeys. Some were only half-
dressed, but we made them stand out in the cold while we 
counted them off. They shivered like rats, but they wouldn't 
work. Next morning, after no food at all for twenty-four 
hours, they sent up word they were ready to go back to work, 
7 Des Moines Register, 8 April and 23 September 1945. 
if we'd feed them first." The Japanese did not rece i ve fo od 
until later that night when they had finished their work. 8 
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The American garrison encountered few other difficulties 
with their captives, and camp life for the Japanese closely 
resembled that of the Germans. As of 19 April 1945, 
approximately 500 Japanese prisoners lived in Camp Clarinda, 
along with nearly 200 Germans who were members of a specialist 
detail, carpenters, cooks, waiters, and electricians. No 
Japanese officers lived among the prisoners at Camp Clarinda, 
as all Japanese officers resided at Camp McCoy. The Japanese 
at first expected horrible treatment or death, and they seemed 
mystified and even happy with their situation. Scant Japanese 
arrivals left the three prisoner compounds relatively empty, 
a~d every barracks had a Japanese leader for the unit. 
Lieutenant Colonel Ball and his staff appointed leaders for 
each compound, and conversations between Japanese and 
Americans took place through Japanese-American soldiers who 
served as interpreters. Showing his concern regarding the 
loyalty of Japanese-American soldiers Ball said that these 
soldiers' "loyalty to America has been fully tested." These 
Nisei interpreters belonged to the 422 Combat Infantry 
Regiment, and Ball correctly assessed their loyalty. At the 
8 Ibid., 8 April 1945. 
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conclusion of the Second World War the 422nd emerged with more 
decorations than any division in American military history. 9 
Well-ingrained prejudices and preconceptions guided the 
development of policies regarding the Japanese prisoners. 
Subsequently, the Japanese endured a particularly racist 
stereotyped image. According to Lieutenant Colonel Ball, 
"Because the Jap is a notorious bargainer we use a policy of 
not giving a damn what he wants. The answer is always no to 
every request. Then if we think some changes should be made, 
we make them later, voluntarily." Preconceptions would also 
affect the people of Clarinda, and articles littered local 
newspapers discussing the characteristics of the Japanese 
soldier, depicted as being tricky, torturous, and liking to 
kill their victims slowly. Before the Japanese arrival in 
Clarinda, the local press displayed contempt for anything 
Japanese. The Herald Journal, commenting on a United States 
government program to transplant Nisei to new locations, 
remarked, "as long as it's not here!" Upon hearing rumors 
regarding how the Japanese POWs were considered dead in their 
homeland for surrendering, the Herald Journal's editor stated, 
"These Japs sure are queer babies!" Racist stereotypes were 
compounded by newspaper warnings of Japanese balloons carrying 
9 Clarinda Herald Journal, 13 December 1943 and 9 April 1945; 
Des Moines Register, 8 April 1945. 
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incendiary bombs expected to arrive on the West Coast. Iowans 
were warned not to touch these bombs if they were seen in the 
area. 10 Stereotypes and administrative hesitance to employ 
Japanese POWs seriously threatened the success of the camp's 
labor program. 
The spring 1945 farming season arrived with southwest 
Iowa in need of more farm laborers than the previous season. 
Fremont County had not experienced much of a labor shortage in 
1944 but prospects for the coming season concerned local 
farmers. Fremont County had the largest War Food 
Administration goals for canning crops in Iowa, with more than 
450 acres of asparagus to cut, the largest asparagus crop of 
any county in the Midwest. In addition, Fremont County 
farmers planted 1,500 acres of peas and 4,900 acres of sweet 
corn, 39.5 percent and 9.5 percent respectively of the state 
totals for those crops. Harley Walker, Fremont County 
extension agent, estimated that it would take 170 POWs weeks 
in favorable weather to harvest the asparagus crop alone. The 
Page County extension office estimated that 75 percent of 
local farmers would not be able to find needed help. Page 
1° First quotation in Des Moines Register, 8 April 1945. See 
Ron Robin, The Barbed-Wire College: Reeducating German POWs in the 
United States During World War II (Princeton NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1995); Second quotation in Des Moines Register, 8 
April 1945; Clarinda Herald Journal, 13 December 1943, 28 May, 2 
August, and 19 July 1945 . 
County extension agent Merril Langfitt remarked, "the only 
possible way we know for supplying adequate labor for your 
farming needs is to help make prison labor available for 
you." 11 With all but 200 German POWs sent to Camp Algona and 
administrators reluctant to employ Japanese prisoners outside 
the compound, meeting these labor needs likely would not 
happen. 
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For Page and Fremont Counties to have successful farm 
seasons they needed agricultural workers. Merril Langfitt 
took immediate steps to remedy the situation. Langfitt called 
an emergency farm meeting on 8 February 1945 for Page and 
Fremont County farmers to discuss the issue. Langfitt stated 
that two county meetings were held, revealing that he expected 
a labor shortage for the coming season. Langfitt presented 
the farmers at the 8 February meeting with four choices to 
solve the labor shortage. Farmers could share labor among 
themselves, attempt to get laborers from surrounding towns, 
request foreign (Mexican) labor, or attempt to get additional 
POW help. Prisoner-of war-labor seemed the most practical 
because most farmers in attendance had already successfully 
employed them. Access to sufficient supplies, however, seemed 
unlikely. Camp Clarina had a sufficient supply of Japanese 
11 Shenandoah Evening Sentinel, 23 February, 7 March, and 8 May 
1945. 
prisoners, but farmers demonstrated no interest in utilizing 
them. Consequently, Langfitt informed the farmers in 
attendance that if they were going to have additional POW 
labor this season they needed to take immediate action. 
Establishing a branch camp to supply the needed labor was an 
option, which required that a request be filed with the 
Seventh Service Command. In this request Langfitt had to 
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tally the number of farmers requesting the labor, and 25 
percent of the labor cost needed to be paid when making the 
formal application. Discussions regarding the employment of 
Japanese POWs arose again, assuming the camp would release 
them for employment, but farmers generally responded 
negatively. Subsequently farmers established a committee of 
five to assess the number of laborers needed, and on 19 
February 1945 Langfitt requested aid from the Seventh Service 
Command. 12 
The Seventh Service Command announced the possible 
establishment of a side camp in Page County if certain 
requirements were met. Prisoner-of-war labor would be made 
available for farmers who requested at least fifty workers, as 
long as they intended to employ them for up to ninety days. 
Because farmers showed a sufficient amount of interest in POW 
12 Clarinda Herald Journal, 8 and 19 February 1945. 
labor the Seventh Service Command established branch camps at 
Shenandoah in western Page County, and at Tabor, in northern 
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Fremont County. These camps initially fell under the command 
of Camp Algona and housed German POWs, but within four months 
were placed under the direct command of Camp Clarinda. 
Lieutenant Colonel Ball asserted that no Japanese POWs would 
be housed in Shenandoah or Tabor because the thought of 
Japanese prisoners living in their communities had the local 
citizens concerned. 13 The number of German prisoners at the 
branch camps in Tabor and Shenandoah would not satisfy the 
labor needs of Fremont and Page County farmers. Therefore, it 
would be necessary to employ Japanese prisoners to ensure the 
success of southwest Iowa's 1945 farming season. 
The hesitation to employ Japanese POWs outside their 
camps, mainly attributable to misconceptions and stereotypes, 
prevented Japanese labor from being utilized to its fullest. 
To overcome this hesitance and employ Japanese POW labor to 
its fullest, General Wilhelm D. Styery, Commander of the 
United States Army in the Western Pacific, declared, "We must 
overcome the psychology that you cannot do this or that. I 
want to see these prisoners work like piss ants! If they do 
1 3 Ibid., 8, 12, 19 and 27 February, 15 March, and 12 July 
1945; Shenandoah Evening Sentinel, 28 February, 5 March, and 23 July 
1945. 
not work, put them on bread and water!" 1 4 Lieutenant Colonel 
Ball took this announcement seriously, and the Japanese at 
Camp Clarinda were soon contracted for outside work, labor 
that proved extremely valuable. 
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Japanese POWs toiled in nurseries and on farms, and these 
prisoners preferred to work together in groups and their 
output lagged if separated. Subsequently, the Japanese were 
sent out in work details always accompanied by an American 
guard and a "war-dog." In the spring of 1944 the War 
Department and the War Manpower Commission established a 
system of incentive pay due to concerns regarding Japanese 
labor. Some of these concerns included POW labor being less 
efficient than free labor in certain situations, racist 
s~ereotypes characterizing the Japanese as poor workers, and 
because employers did not like to pay on a man-day or man-hour 
basis. The Japanese were compensated according to the number 
of "units completed," such as bushels of corn shucked, up to a 
maximum of $1.20 per day. Because the POWs would be paid 
according to the amount of work done, and not simply for the 
hours worked, this system rewarded hard workers and punished 
slow workers. On some occasions camp commanders implemented a 
14 Quote in George Lewis and John Mewha, History 
War Utilization by the United States Army, 1776-1945, 
D.C.: Department of the Army, 1955), 253-54. 
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task system, where each POW or detail had a specific amount of 
work to complete within a certain period of time. In these 
instances camp officials chose the amount of work to be 
completed in such a way that, if accomplished, each POW 
received the eighty cents per day guaranteed by the Geneva 
Convention. Because negative stereotypes concerning the 
Japanese prisoner's competence led camp officials to believe 
that they would be of little value picking corn, a group 
contracted by a local farmer, Elmer Hodson of Tarkio Township, 
set out to work on the task system with output expected to be 
less than that of German labor. 15 
On most occasions, German prisoners acted as foremen on 
Japanese work patrols, and on 29 March 1945, a Japanese leader 
with little or no experience picking corn took charge. The 
Japanese laborers worked at a rapid pace that the American 
guards assumed would quickly wear out the prisoners. After 
the eight-hour day had ended, the POWs were still going 
strong. A dozen Japanese POWs shucked 600-700 bushels the 
first day, averaging fifty-two to fifty-three bushels per man. 
According to Lieutenant Colonel Ball, "The first time we used 
the task rate we took a dozen of these monkeys over to a 
farmer to help him shuck corn. We had it figured out they 
15 Ibid., 120-21; Clarinda Herald Journal, 29 March, 9 April, 
and 7 May 1945. 
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could get no more than fifty o r sixt y cents o f c o rn husked i n 
t heir eight hours. But, can you imagine it, the men averaged 
between fifty-two and fifty-three bushels of corn that day. 
They finished up the day with more than a do l lar apiece. We 
had to make some changes after that." 16 
Following the work at the Hodson farm, forty Japanese 
prisoners were brought to a farm in Ringgold County to pick 
corn. On this occasion, the Japanese received ten cents per 
bushel, decreasing the amount they could earn in a days work. 
During the summer detasseling season, the Berry Seed Company 
employed 1,091 man-days of Japanese labor. Discovering that 
many Japanese soldiers had been former rice farmers, 
Lieutenant Colonel Ball remarked, "They're good at anything to 
do with agriculture. They're built so close to the ground 
they can get down easier." 17 Having developed a reputation as 
experts in horticulture, the Japanese were quickly contracted 
to help ease a labor shortage in the busy nurseries of 
Shenandoah. 
Swamped with orders, nearby nurseries contracted Japanese 
POW labor. Early in March 1945 one unit of twenty-five 
16 Clarinda Herald Journal, 29 March 1945. Quotation in Des 
Moines Register, 8 April 1945. 
17 Annual Narrative Reports, Page County Extension Office, 1945, 
9; Quote in Des Moines Register, 23 September 1945; Lewis and Mewha, 
Prisoner of War Utilization, 148-49. 
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Japanese prisoners worked in the Shenandoah nurseries, 
assigned to apple tree slip planting. Tying burlap around 
their knees, they quickly went to work. The nursery operators 
reported that the Japanese prisoners did more and better work 
than the former German prisoners. Nursery operators told 
Lieutenant Colonel Ball that they were "well pleased" at the 
"good job" performed by the Japanese. From May to August 1945 
the Shenandoah nurseries employed 9,609 man-days of Japanese 
labor while employing 6,750 man-days of German labor. 18 
Successful employment of Japanese prisoners in this area 
allowed nursery operators to meet consumer demand and helped 
to encourage their employment in other work outside the camp. 
The arrival of Japanese prisoners in Clarinda threatened 
the success of the 1945-farming season. Racism and 
stereotypes fostered local hesitation to employ Japanese 
laborers. Reluctance eventually eroded by March 1945 due in 
part to the War Department's pressure to employ as many POWs 
as possible. In addition, those employers who hired Japanese 
POWs were pleased with their performance. 
In Page County, farmers banded together to employ POW 
labor. Farmers were kept informed about the labor situation 
18 Clarinda Herald Journal, 9 April 1945; Des Moines Register, 
8 April 1945; Annual Narrative Reports, Page County Extension 
Office, 1945, 8. 
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through newspaper publicity and letters from the county labor 
office. German and Japanese prisoners of war were employed in 
Page County for 24,623 man-days through the labor office. 
Figuring an average of eight hours per day at fifty cents per 
hour, the total amount paid by employers for labor from May to 
August 1945 was $98,492. This figure represented only POW 
labor. Although expensive, the labor had to be performed. 19 
Fremont County benefited from German and Japanese POW 
labor as well and employed a considerable number of prisoners. 
During the 1945 season, the Page County Farm Labor office 
placed 609 workers with 184 farmers, while Fremont County 
placed 7,407 workers with 320 farmers, for a total cost of 
$70,183.86. Ninety percent of those employed in Fremont 
County labored as short-term help in harvesting truck crops. 
Between 22 March and 30 November 1945, 121,667 man-hours of 
POW labor were used. Prisoner-of-war labor in Fremont County 
harvested peas, put up hay, cut weeds out of corn, hauled 
manure, fed cattle, built fence and cut 199,767 pounds of 
asparagus. Harley Walker commented that the "amount of POW 
help would be equivalent to every farmer in Fremont County 
using one POW for a period of about ten days." Branch camps 
had provided more accessibility to POW labor, increasing the 
1 9 , Langfitt, Annual Narrative Reports, Page County Extension 
Office, 1945, 8-9. 
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number of farmers able to use it. The Herald Journal reported 
that in Page and Fremont Counties "prisoner labor was a 
lifesaver for farmers this past season. Many farms would not 
have been run without their help." 20 
20Annual Narrative Reports, Fremont County Extension Office, 
1945, 2-13. Prisoners could be placed on more than one occasion, 
which accounts for the large number of placements in Fremont County; 




"A number of Algona folks didn't like the idea of a camp 
here, but now that it is here we must do our best to 
cooperate." 
In order to provide a secure environment for their 
prisoners and successful l y employ them as agricultural 
laborers, officials at Camp Algona and Camp Clarinda 
deliberately and systematically engineered a relationship 
between the camps and the local communities that emphasized 
cooperation. The people of Iowa cooperated with the camps and 
their occupants out of concern for American men overseas and 
for the vital role that the prisoners would play in supplying 
essential labor. Furthermore, garrisons of American soldiers 
brought substantial military payrolls that were spent in town 
thus stimulating the local economy. This relationship, 
however, would be difficult to obtain for the POW camps in 
small Iowa communities because the POWs often encountered an 
array of stereotypes and preconceived notions. Throughout the 
time Axis prisoners were interned in Iowa, frequent contact 
and experience with both the American contingents and POWs 
ensured a cooperative relationship in addition to a successful 
labor program. 
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Local newspapers expressed the hesitation of Iowans to 
accept the camps. An editorial in the Algona Upper Des Moines 
remarked that a number of people in the community considered 
the camp to be a great detriment to the life of the city. 
According to the editor, "In places like Douglas, Wyoming, all 
the Army and working men increased drunkenness and immorality 
and received no added business. We do not understand just who 
it was that suggested Algona to the government as a good place 
for a prison camp but we have heard very little favorable 
comment." 1 In the face of mounting opposition in Algona, the 
secretary of the Algona Chamber of Commerce, C. A. Phillips, 
contacted the Scottsbluff, Nebraska, Chamber of Commerce 
inquiring about the effect of the POW camp there on the 
community. Phillips reported that the Scottsbluff community 
had experienced no difficulties with the POWs, they were being 
employed effectively in agricultural work, and that camp had 
proven to be an asset to the community. Phillips then 
scheduled an opportunity for the public to visit the camp on 
16 December 1943. Below zero temperatures discouraged all but 
300 visitors and the visitation proved to be less successful 
than anticipated. Visits from three hundred Algonans to the 
1 Algona Upper Des Moines, 5 August 1943. 
camp was a far cry fr om the 4 , 000 that came out to inspect 
Algona's sister camp in Clarinda the following January. 2 
The Algona Chamber of Commerce made another attempt to 
garner support in March 1944, inviting 200 members of the 
Algona, Fort Dodge, and Emmetsburg Chambers of Commerce to a 
dinner and dance. These visitors were enterta ined by a 
program in the post theatre in addition to getting a tour of 
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the camp. Italian prisoners prepared a typical military menu, 
and subsequently performed a vocal and musical program for the 
guests. Community displeasure arose quickly, although the 
disapproval was not with the camp itself. A letter to the 
editor from Algonan Edward Capesius complained that the 
community had been promised access to the camp but that it had 
not been allowed. Capesius commented that the citizens of 
Algona were paying for a camp that they could not see. 
According to Capesius, ill-feelings had been created by the 
camp, intensified by the recent article in the Algona Upper 
Des Moines regarding the Chamber of Commerce dinner and dance 
at the camp. According to Capesius, "If this isn't going to 
be a POW camp maybe we should change the name. Farmers feel 
if they toil sun up to sun down they should be given the same 
privilege [as the Chamber of Commerce]." Less than a week 
2 Ibid., 14 October, and 16 December 1943; Clarinda Herald 
Journal, 10 January 1944. 
passed before the Upper Des Moines announced another 
inspection open to the community that would take place on 26 
March 1944. 3 
Clarindans received their first chance to see the 
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finished camp when commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel 
Arthur E. Lobdell, invited the public to inspect the 
facilities on 9 January 1944. Lobdell had announced a few 
weeks earlier that the administration and operations staffs 
were now functioning at the camp. Lobdell's announcement 
could not have come at a more opportune time, as a 
considerable level of concern permeated the community. 
Clarinda, a small midwestern town, was understandably hesitant 
at the thought of thousands of men, some friend and some foe, 
entering their community. Some Clarindans feared for their 
daughters, because "fast-talking" soldiers from both coasts 
would be arriving soon. 4 The public greeted the decision to 
open the camp with hesitant anticipation, and the editor of 
the Herald Journal commented "for weeks we have been 'dying to 
know' what it's all about." 5 During construction the 
3 Algona Upper Des Moines, 14 March 1944. 
4 Corinne and Wilbur Goecker, interview with the author, 
Clarinda, Iowa, 21 March 2000. 
5 Clarinda Herald Journal, 20 December 1943, 6, and 10 January 
1944. 
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c ommunity was not permitted to view the camp closely, except 
for those civilians employed for labor. On the afternoon of 9 
January 1944, military escorts accompanied more than 850 cars 
for the one-half hour drive around the camp, which included 
tours on foot led by camp soldiers. When the visit ended 
4,000 civilians had visited the camp. While both Iowa camps 
made conscious efforts to appease public scrutiny, the Upper 
Des Moines remarked, "A number of Algona folks didn't like the 
idea of a camp here, but now that it is here we must do our 
best to cooperate." 6 This statement expressed the future 
development of community-camp relations in Iowa, since the 
communities learned, albeit slowly, to cooperate and accept 
the camps. In order to develop a relationship based on 
cooperation between the camps and the local communities, a 
skillful public relations campaign would be necessary. 
Although Camp Clarinda's and Camp Algona's creation had 
economic motivations, the economic success of the camps 
depended largely on the reaction of the local community. 
Aided by Lieutenant Colonel Lobdell's public relations skills, 
utilized first in Clarinda then Algona, community acceptance 
6Ibid., 10 January 1944; Algona Upper Des Moines, 28 March 
1944. 
of the camps and their inhabitants began early in their 
existence and continued throughout their operating years. 
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Camp administrations sought to employ local citizens for 
various tasks within the camp itself. The camp's post 
exchanges needed managers, barbers, bookkeepers, clerical and 
sales people as well as individuals with restaurant 
experience. Additionally, the camp required stenographers, 
typists and clerks to work in the headquarters and carpenters, 
firemen, plumbers, engineers, laborers, nurses, truck drivers, 
blacksmiths and equipment operators to perform various other 
necessary tasks. These individuals had to pass civil service 
exams prior to employment. 7 
Local citizens engaged in various activities in order to 
educate the community about the camp. A myriad of local 
groups and organizations paid visits to the camp during their 
existence, including police officers and highway patrolmen, 
rural eighth-graders on citizenship day, and the district 
convention of the Seventh Service District of Legionnaires. 
The communities also engaged in bond drives to raise money for 
the war effort, and camp garrisons gave army show tours to the 
neighboring communities. Mrs. A. T. Lobdell, Lieutenant 
Colonel Lobdell's wife, headed a local volunteer service 
7 Ibid., 20 December 1943. 
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committee of women in the Clarinda vicinity. This committee 
attempted to alleviate stress-related problems of the families 
of men who were serving overseas. The Herald Journal stated 
that "no problem [is] too large and no problem is too small" 
for this committee. 8 
Community members also had the opportunity to interact 
with the camp through athletic events. For example Camp 
Clarinda had three ball diamonds, two softball and one 
baseball, two volleyball and two horseshoe courts, two clay 
tennis and two basketball courts as well as a football field. 
Softball tournaments held at the camp were open to the 
community, and civilian teams often took the field against 
teams of American guards. Sporting events became such an 
integral facet of the camp- community relationship that the 
Herald Journal began publishing a regular column titled "POW 
Sports Shorts," where descriptions of the athletic happenings 
at the camp could be found. Civilian softball teams did not 
fare well, however, when they faced the camp softball team. 
The Clarinda "PW" team, comprised of American soldiers, won 
two consecutive state softball titles and also won the Seventh 
8 Ibid., 20 March, 24 April, 29 May, 19 June 1944, and 15 
January 1945. 
Service Command Tournament in 1944. 9 The success of the 
camp's athletic program allowed local citizens to view the 
American garrison not only as soldiers, but also as regular 
people. 
Local acceptance of POW camps in their communities was 
not a foregone conclusion. The citizens of Hannibal, 
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Missouri, upon the arrival of 200 German POWs from Camp 
Clarinda who were sent to establish a branch camp, protested 
the encampment of the prisoners at the local baseball park. 
Hannibal community leaders held numerous meeting regarding the 
presence of the camp in their town, causing the POW's stay to 
be shorter than expected. 10 Some negative relationships 
developed between the American garrison and local citizens 
that challenged community acceptance. In an attempt by camp 
officials to clean up moral conditions involving Camp Clarinda 
and the local community, especially suspected adulterous 
affairs, two married women were sentenced by a local judge to 
six months detention at Rockwell City, Iowa, for lewdness and 
indecent exposure. Apparently the women met with German POWs 
from a branch camp in Shenandoah on Saturday nights, when 
9 Ibid., 22 May, 5 June, 7 September 1944, and 30 August 1945. 
10 16-18 September 1944, newspaper not listed, World War II 
clipping file State Historical Library, Des Moines, Iowa. 
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guards were lax in their supervision. Additionall y , a camp 
clerk, Nicholas Berry, of Shambaugh, Iowa, stole 1,000 
cigarette boxes, and a United States Army sergeant was courts-
martialed for an alcohol-induced fight at Johnson Brothers 
Recreation Hall in Clarinda. 11 Negative encounters such as 
these involving the garrison and the civilian population were 
infrequent. Although negative interactions challenged 
community acceptance they did not inhibit the development of a 
cooperative relationship in which the camps and local citizens 
worked together for mutual benefit. 
Iowans slowly accepted the presence of an enemy prison 
camp in their communities. This acceptance was due in part to 
the fact that thousands of Iowans, more than 2,000 Page County 
men alone, served overseas during the war. 12 By cooperating 
with the camps the people of Iowa could actively aid in the 
waging of the war that took their young men so far from home. 
The garrisons at Camp Clarinda and Camp Algona became 
temporary Iowans themselves, and the local communities wanted 
them to feel welcome. The Axis prisoners received similar 
treatment. 
11 Shenandoah Evening Sentinel, 12 October 1944 and 4 January 
1945; Clarinda Herald Journal, 3 August 1944, and 12 July and 20 
August 1945. 
12 Clarinda Herald Journal, 10 May 1945. 
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Despite scattered opposition, the German internees found 
acceptance among the community. Lieutenant Arthur M. Simpson, 
officer in charge of Algona's branch camp in Waverly, 
reaffirmed that the German prisoners were treated according to 
the Geneva Convention. The Algona Upper Des Moines 
consistently reminded its readers that as of July 1944 five 
Algona boys and five Kossuth County boys were being held 
prisoner in German POW camps. Fair treatment of American 
soldiers in German camps could be aided by fair treatment to 
German prisoners in camps like Algona's. Moreover, German 
soldiers, hearing of the treatment their comrades received in 
American camps as opposed to Soviet camps, were more likely to 
surrender to American troops. Captain Clyde Herring, son of a 
former senator and a former POW himself reported that German 
speaking American soldiers overheard German civilians talking 
about the fair treatment their relatives received in the 
United States. This in turn led to mass surrenders, and to 
fair treatment of American POWs. A June 1944 editorial in the 
Algona Upper Des Moines noted a new arrival of Germans, 
"Mostly very young, weary and disillusioned. Many had their 
dogs with them." According to the editorial, it pleased many 
Algonans to see that "these victims of a Hitlerized youth were 
allowed to keep their pets . [and] we hope that our 
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prisoners over there are a l s o allowed a few small , decent 
favors. " 13 News such as this had a tremendous influence on 
Iowans and acted as a constant reminder of their boys 
overseas. 
By 8 May 1945, the citizens of Page County could say that 
sixty-nine of their boys were captives in European prison 
camps and five in camps in the Pacific. Editorials in local 
newspapers reminded their readers "Those of us having boys in 
German prison camps will be interested in seeing that fair 
treatment is given to German or other prisoners here." The 
citizens of Clarinda received evidence of fair treatment of 
American POWs on 6 July 1944, when news arrived from a Dr. 
Colton, a YMCA worker who brought first-hand information from 
camps in Europe. Dr. Colton reported that the Germans were 
upholding the terms of the Geneva Convention in the same 
manner that the Americans were, although American prisoners 
did not eat as well because the Germans could not feed their 
own soldiers adequately. 14 Reports such as this influenced a 
significant portion of the community about how they perceived 
13 Algona Upper Des Moines, 27 June and 18 July 1944; Terry 
Paul Wilson, "The Afrika Korps in Oklahoma: Fort Reno's POW 
Compound," Chronicles of Oklahoma 52 (Fall 1974): 367; Shenandoah 
Evening Sentinel, 26 June 1945. 
14 Shenandoah Evening Sentinel, 8 May 1945; Quote in Clarinda 
Herald Journal, 8 November 1943, and 7 July 1944. 
the camps and their German inhabitants. Technical Sergeant 
Patrick Smith stated at a l ocal library forum that if the 
German POW did not have his uniform on "he would be no 
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different than you." The secretary of the Clarinda Chamber of 
Commerce, Hans Morgan, said that the camp had been "favorably 
receiv ed by the citizens of Clarinda and the surrounding 
area. 1 5 The local communities often referred to the German 
prisoners as "our POWs," but not everyone in Iowa accepted the 
camps. Accepting enemy prisoners of war was at times a 
difficult task. 
Those people who could not accept the presence of German 
soldiers in their community could not overcome the glaring 
fact that these men were the enemy. Tensions rose between 
some citizens of Algona and the camp's inhabitants when the 
German prisoners were allowed to swim in Algona's $30,000 
pool. After paying like civilians, eighty POWs were permitted 
to swim in the pool. In the ensuing days numerous citizens of 
Algona filed objections to the city council, which then denied 
further use of the pool to POWs. Objections included 
statements that the Germans "were unclean, physically unfit, 
and [Algonans] shouldn't be contaminated by the Nazis." 
Lieutenant Ted Chrischilles, an Algona native serving in 
15 First quote in Clarinda Herald Journal, 17 January 1944; 
Second quote in Des Moines Register, 23 April 1944. 
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France, wrote an article for Algona Upper Des Moines in which 
he criticized recent reports of German prisoners swimming in 
Algona's pool. According to Lieutenant Chrichilles, "To me it 
doesn't make sense-i.e. a Nazi kills 20 of our boys and then 
gives up and goes to the United States to be treated like some 
American fighting man with a few privileges taken awa y ." 
Chrichilles also believed "they [Germans] should be treated 
like prisoners and remember they could have killed an Algona 
boy. ,,16 
As of 31 July 1944, ten Clarinda men had been reported 
killed in action. This news encouraged angry outbursts, such 
as an editorial in the Shenandoah Evening Sentinel by W. D. 
Archie. Archie, referring to both the Germans and Japanese, 
stated "These arrogant peoples inspire me to deep hatred. I 
would have little compunction in shooting them. They stand 
for everything I hate." Comments like this certainly did not 
help prisoner-community relations. 17 
The most vehement opposition to the German POWs after the 
funeral held for the only German prisoner to die in a Clarinda 
branch camp on 1 October 1944. In protest of the funeral held 
for the German POW, an article in the public forum section of 
16Algona Upper Des Moines, 18 July and 15 August 1944. 
17 Clarinda Herald Journal, 31 July 1944, and 20 August 1945; 
Quote in Shenandoah Evening Sentinel, 27 February 1945. 
117 
the Des Moines Register submitted by Mrs. J. 0. McMath of 
Diagonal, Iowa, stated that "The picture in the October 
Register, showing the burial rites of a Nazi prisoner of war, 
whose casket was draped with the Nazi flag, with huge bouquets 
of flowers, with our own people gathered around in mourning, 
demonstrates very clearly why the Nazi thought the Americans 
very soft and easy victims of their plans." Mrs. McMath, 
referring to the possible coddling of German prisoners, added, 
"The Americans are soft to allow such a burial. Why display 
the Nazi flag and allow the Hitlerite uniform to be worn? Why 
pamper and coddle these depraved murderers with the best of 
everything? Why should boys die and the country become 
burdened with debt to fight this war if we are going to allow 
the Nazi flag to be displayed and the Nazi rites to be 
practiced over here? Have all our dead, our tortured, been 
sacrificed in vain. . Wait and see what our returned 
soldiers think of such treachery." Des Moines Register 
editors responded by stating that decent treatment of the POWs 
may give them a more profound respect for democracy and 
perhaps make them susceptible to a change of heart regarding 
what is right and wrong. Additionally, the editors assumed 
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that the treatment fell within the requirements of the Geneva 
Convention that the United States promised to uphold. 18 
Reports of a possible problem with malaria at Camp 
Clarinda also dampened public relations. Seventy-one cases of 
malaria among German POWs and two among American soldiers 
brought some concern to the community, although camp officials 
did not view it as a serious threat. With no deaths 
attributed to the outbreak, camp authorities warned the public 
not to fish near the camp, and encouraged farmers to drain any 
mosquito infested standing or stagnant pools of water that may 
have contributed to the outbreak. 19 Despite minor community 
resistance, those Iowans directly affected by the camps 
accepted them. 
Inhabitants of communities where branch camps were 
located took an interest in the camps. In September 1944 
rumors circulated throughout Waverly, where more than one 
hundred Germans worked for the Marshall Canning Company. 
These rumors accused camp officials of feeding the German POWs 
nothing more than bread and water. As a result of the 
accusations camp officials invited the editor of the Waverly 
18 Des Moines Register, 26 October 1944. 
19 Annual Narrative Reports, Page County Extension Office, 
1943, 3; Clarinda Herald Journal, 29 May 1944; Des Moines Register, 
28 May 1944. 
Independent Republican to take a tour of the camp to dispel 
the rumors. Not only were the prisoners eating bread and 
water, but they were also eating ham and bacon, roast beef, 
cheese, potatoes, cold vegetables, butter, sugar bread, 
coffee, chocolate milk, and cake on birthdays. The editor's 
119 
report described the branch camp's thirteen tents, surrounded 
by six-foot barbed wire fences. German prisoners of war wrote 
letters, laughed and sang, and cleared brush around the 
perimeter for canteen coupons. Many of the men wore 
decorations and insignia's of rank, with Iron Crosses on some, 
and ranks from corporal to master sergeant on others. No 
evidence of mistreatment was apparent, and the report ended 
with the editor commenting, "No one stared at him unduly like 
the members of this community stare at them [prisoners], 
wasting gas and tires by driving past the plant.u20 
As the initial shock passed, Iowans began the process of 
developing a cooperative relationship with the camps. 
Acceptance would be due, in part, to the fact that thousands 
of Iowan men would be serving their country overseas. Thus, 
the people of Iowa were able to actively aid in the waging of 
the war that took their young men far from home. In addition, 
the camp would bring economic prosperity and a possible supply 
20 Waverly Independent Republican, 30 August and 6 September 
1944. 
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of additional farm laborers. As the Second World War came to 
an end, however, the process of prisoner repatriation began. 
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CHAPTER 6 
REPATRIATION AND CAMP CLOSINGS 
"When the Germans left they drove them around the square, we 
all waved and some of us cried." 
The war in Europe ended in May 1945, followed by victory 
in the Pacific in August. The end of the war necessitated the 
process of prisoner repatriation. In August 1945 with wet 
conditions preventing Camp Clarinda's Japanese prisoners from 
working in the fields, translators listened to a radio in each 
compound to keep the POWs informed about the fall of their 
homeland. The prisoners learned of the atomic bombs dropped 
on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and on 16 August 1945 received news 
of the Japanese capitulation. Lieutenant Colonel Ball 
described some of the Japanese as having poker faces with the 
announcement of the news, some reacted with surprise, and 
others felt that it was propaganda, because they had expected 
nothing less than complete victory. Although several POWs 
reacted with depression in the following days, there was no 
demonstrating, agitating, or striking following Japan's 
defeat. 1 After the Japanese capitulation, some of the POWs at 
Camp Clarinda changed their minds about returning home. 
1 Clarinda Herald Journal, 13 and 16 August 1945; Des Moines 
Register, 23 September 1945. 
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Initially Japanese prisoners preferred death to surrender and 
felt that returning home would be impossible, since they had 
disgraced their families. With the entire country's surrender 
the prisoners wanted to return home as quickly as possible to 
help in the rebuilding process. 2 
In August 1945 local newspapers announced that the 
Japanese prisoners were being shipped to the San Joachin 
Valley in California to help raise vegetables. From there, 
the Japanese lived in holding camps in California while 
awaiting their shipment home. By October 1945 Camp Clarinda 
lost its remaining POW population, and it fina l ly closed on 1 
December 1945. 3 Lieutenant Colonel Ball left to command a 
camp near Atlanta, Nebraska, and the War Department declared 
C9mp Clarinda surplus, auctioning it off piece by piece. On 9 
August 1945 the last of the local soldiers returned home from 
POW camps in Europe. 4 
According to Lieutenant Colonel Lobdell, when victory in 
Europe was announced at Camp Algona seven German POWs went 
insane. Straight jackets were placed on all seven, and they 
2 Des Moines Register, 23 September 1945. 
3 Clarinda Herald Journal, 16 August and 4 October 1945; 
Shenandoah Evening Sentinel, 9 May 1945. 
4 Clarinda Herald Journal, 9 August and 4, 18, and 22 October 
1945. 
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were brought in from the branch camps to Algona's base 
hospital, where three recovered and four were immediately 
shipped back to Germany. Soon thereafter 378 German prisoners 
arrived in Algona, with an estimated 90 percent wounded. 
Additionally, thirty scurvy-ridden POWs comprised this group 
along with seventy-five fourteen-year olds who weighed an 
average of sixty pounds each. Lobdell observed, "It was very 
apparent that Germany had scraped the bottom of the barrel of 
their manpower," as an additional sixty Germans were more than 
fifty years old and forty-two had double hernias. 5 
Of the 10,000 prisoners that passed through Algona and 
its branch camps, Lieutenant Colonel Lobdell was confident 
that they left Algona in better physical condition than when 
they arrived. Mentally, only the hard-core Nazi's (about 10 
percent of the population) remained unchanged. Lobdell 
believed that many of the Germans returned to Germany with the 
ability to actively participate in the creation of a German 
Democratic government. 
Although the German prisoners may have been ready to 
create a German democracy, repatriation did not proceed 
quickly for POWs at Camp Algona. During the summer of 1945 
5 Arthur Lobdell, "Report from A.T. Lobdell to Governor Dwight 
Griswold 9 January 1947," Algona POW camp vertical file, Algona 
Public Library. 
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the prisoners learned that they would be used as farm laborers 
until the Japanese were defeated. With Germany politically 
unstable and the allies vying to solidify control of their 
respective zones, camp commanders used their discretion to 
decide when their POWs should be sent to the nearest Port of 
Embarkation. German prisoners resented being kept in 
captivity and their frustration grew when the War Department 
announced in November 1945 that many of them would be sent to 
France and placed in labor battalions to help rebuild that 
country. Critics of this policy claimed that the German 
prisoners were being sold into slave labor and the effects may 
have been to diminish the POWs appreciation for American 
democracy. 6 
Late in 1945 Algona's branch camps began to close one by 
one, the last being Onawa in November. Algona's German 
prisoners began leaving in early October, when nearly 1,000 
prisoners traveled to Greeley, Colorado, to fill labor needs 
in the beet fields. In November an additional 2,000 German 
POWs headed for the East Coast, where they would then be sent 
to France. Finally on 22 January 1946, 600 more POWs left for 
Fort Cook, Nebraska, where they would be prepared for shipment 
to Europe. The remaining 100 prisoners remained at the camp 
6 Arnold Krammer, Nazi Prisoners of War in America (New York: 
Stein and Day, 1979), 242 -43. 
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until its official closing in February 194 6 , nine months after 
the war in Europe ended. Camp Algona was then declared 
. 7 
surplus and the majority was sold off piece by piece. 
A final statement prepared by the German POWs in Algona 
reflecting their views on the end of the war read as follows: 
We Germans may be glad for two reasons, first the 
frightful massacre of the last decade has come to an end 
and the world is moving again. . Second, the United 
States will get a fabulous prosperity in the next few 
years and therefore, will be able to economically support 
the destroyed Europe. Germany has lost the war, 
irrevocably and definitely having understood this hard 
fact and having seen the chance of a total world victory 
by the Nazi system collapse we may call ourselves lucky 
finding the powers of the universe in the hands of the 
democracies, for only these are the guarantees that the 
immense energies will not be applied for world destroying 
conquests. Our lives depend upon that. All Germans 
feeling freedom of fear the most precious of the four 
freedoms will agree with our statement. Germany has lost 
the war, but it had to lose it to clear the way to closed 
resources of the German spirit and German inwardness. If 
this will give the German people a respect of others' 
rights we shall be able to establish a German kind of 
democracy, but the way there is stony and long." 8 
By 1945, the Iowans had realized that the economic value 
of the POW was so great that any real objection was nullified. 
In Algona alone the camp spent an estimated $4000 per month on 
supplies for its mess halls. Additionally, employment of POW 
labor in both nursery and farm work was of important economic 
7 Algona Upper Des Moines, 4 October, 22 November 1945, and 22 
January 1946. 
8 Quoted in Lobdell, "Report to Governor Dwight Griswold." 
value. Edward J. Pluth, in his analysis of the significance 
of the POW labor program in Minnesota, asserted, "It was not 
the intent of the program that employers profit by using 
prisoners rather than other labor. But in the absence of 
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other workers, the prisoners helped prevent economically 
damaging timber and crop losses." The evidence indicates that 
this was certainly true in Iowa. Prisoner-of-war labor may 
not have always been economically profitable, nor was it 
always as efficient as civilian labor. Iowa farmers were 
required to provide transportation in a time when gasoline was 
rationed and the POWs proved less efficient than civilian 
labor on tasks that required training such as detasseling 
corn. Nevertheless, POW labor prevented crop loss and helped 
farmers meet increased production demands made by the War Food 
Administration. Despite limited use in corn detasseling, the 
Page County farm labor office stated that POWs detasseling 5 
acres produces 50,000 bushels of corn. Page County extension 
agent Merril Langfitt, assessing the success of the POW labor 
program, commented that the prisoner of war "assistance and 
cooperation greatly assisted in solving the major labor 
problems in the county." 9 
9 First quotation in Edward J. Pluth, "Prisoner of War 
Employment in Minnesota During World War II," Minnesota History 44 
(Winter 1975): 301-02; Second quotation in Clarinda Herald Journal, 
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In time Iowa communities accepted the camps and their own 
role in waging the war. Not everyone approved of the camp, or 
developed a personal relationship with its inhabitants. When 
news spread that a camp would come to Algona, many doubted 
that it would be an asset to the community. Most of the 
community's inhabitants, however, realized the camp's 
existence was necessary for the war effort. Citizens of 
Algona were pleased to see that these "victims" of a 
"Hitlerized youth" were going to indirectly aid in the 
American war effort. Jean Leaneagh Fausnaugh of Algona 
expressed a typical and crucial observation when she 
explained, "I remember watching the long train arrive, and 
looking hard at the windows, looking for a monster. I looked 
right in the eyes of one of them-and to my surprise the POW 
looked like everyone else-one of us." 10 
Southwest Iowans knew that the camps' existence was 
necessary for the war effort. Dorothy Johnson, remembering 
the German prisoners who worked on her farm, said, "We really 
got acquainted with them. If my son was over there, I hoped 
6 July 1944; Third quotation in Annual Narrative Reports, Page 
County Extension Office, 1944, 8; Des Moines Register, 10 November 
1945. 
10 Algona Upper Des Moines, 14 October 1943 and 6 and 27 June 
1944; "A Collection of Memories of the Algona Prisoner of War Camp, 
1943-1946," Vertical File, Algona Public Library. 
someone would treat him as well. When the Germans left they 
drove them around the square, we all waved and some of us 
cried." 11 Local farmers sent care packages to their German 
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laborers well after they had been repatriated, and one farmer 
sent a loan of $500 to a former German POW who had worked on 
his farm, no questions asked. The farmer eventually received 
payment. Some local farmers even received visits by their old 
laborers years later, and naturally, the Germans stayed in 
their homes. 12 
In spite of feeling the brunt of racism, the Japanese at 
Camp Clarinda were treated according to the Geneva Convention 
and aided in the attainment of war production goals for the 
surrounding community. The greatest effect captivity had on 
the Japanese POW, according to Arnold Krammer, was their 
exposure to democracy, which, no doubt, affected some of them 
for the rest of their lives. 13 While the Japanese gained 
familiarity with democracy (whether they wanted it or not) the 
people of southwest Iowa gained exposure to a culture that few 
11 Dorothy Johnson, interview with the author, Clarinda, Iowa, 
21 March 2000. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Arnold Krammer, "Japanese Prisoners of War in America," 
Pacific Historical Review 52 (February 1983): 89-90. 
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of them knew much about, as well as the opportunity to benefit 
from Japanese labor. 
Albeit not war related, southwest Iowans are again faced 
with the presence of the Japanese in their community. 
Japanese prisoners helped the southwest Iowa farm economy in 
1945, and today two Japanese - owned corporations employ nearl y 
500 Clarindans, more than any other businesses in the 
cornrnunity. 14 Japanese citizens are again calling Clarinda 
home, and although still not welcomed by all, their presence 
is still accepted as necessary to the success of the economy 
and the town. The people of Algona still feel the camp's 
presence as well. In November 1945 the Christmas season 
brought the unveiling of a nativity scene at the prisoner-of-
war camp. The nativity scene remains on display at the 
Kossuth County fairgrounds. 15 
The topic of POWs in Iowa is still emotionally charged, 
something that has not changed since 1945. In September 2002, 
a nonprofit group located in Mason City, Iowa, conducted a 
tour of the Midwest in which a group of German ex-prisoners 
and their families were reunited with some of their former 
captors. A conference held in early October, in Muscatine, 
14 Des Moines Register, 4 December 1991. 
15 Algona Upper Des Moines, 29 November 1945. 
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Iowa, led some Iowans to criticize the tour. According to 
Michael Liuck-Thrams, the tour's organizer, "We're being 
accused of basically collaborating with the enemy. And that's 
for a war that's been over for six decades." Kurt Butzlaff, 
one of the former German POWs in Iowa for the tour, expressed 
sentiment that was more commonly heard in 1945 than in 2002. 
Butzlaff remarked "We're not enemies, man to man." When asked 
about his time as a POW in Iowa, Butzlaff recalled harvesting 
oats and said, "That was good work. At home, my father was a 
farmer. " 16 
From the initial construction of the camps in 1943 to 
their final closings in 1946, camp officials carried out a 
conscious and determined effort to engineer a relationship 
based on cooperation between the camps and the local 
communities. Establishing POW camps in Iowa proved beneficial 
both for the government and for Iowans. Iowa was a safe and 
secure environment for POW internment and the camps became 
assets to the local communities. Demonstrating their 
willingness to employ enemy workers, Iowans helped the camps 
operate successful labor programs. Without available POW 
labor, crops would have rotted in the fields and farmers would 
not have met wartime production goals, preventing them from 
1 6 Des Moines Register, 26 September 2002. 
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feeding American soldiers over seas. An unsuccessful labor 
program would have been financially devastating to local 
nurseries, canneries, and hemp plants. Instead, the camps 
brought substantial military payrolls that stimulated the 
local economies and provided essential workers. Confronted 
with the enemy, Iowans realized that these prisoners were 
indeed human and in demonstrating their acceptance not only 
fulfilled their sense of duty and helped win the war, they 
encouraged similar treatment of their loved ones in enemy POW 
camps. Acceptance for many community members did not mean an 
unquestioning fondness for the prisoners, but rather an 
understanding that acceptance meant remaining loyal and 
contributing to the war effort. Some of these enemies not 
only helped to solve the critical shortage of labor, but also 
in a relatively brief period often developed relationships 
that would last a lifetime. 
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